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INTRODUCTION

Liberalism is widely regarded as "[t]he dominant strand of
American political philosophy,"1 and neutrality is often identified as one of the defining features and virtues of the liberal
state. 2 Not surprisingly, then, talk of neutrality deeply informs
1. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 878 (1991); see also
WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE
LIBERAL STATE 79 (1991) ("Most Anglo-Americans are, in one way or another,

liberals; all are deeply influenced by the experience of life in liberal societies.").
2. See, e.g., CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 42 (1987)
(arguing that the characteristic feature of liberalism is not how it "distinguishes

the public from the private" and that instead "the distinctive liberal notion is that
of the neutrality of the state"); JOHN RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 190-91 (expanded ed. 2005) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM] ("Historically one
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our public discourse concerning not only the nature of law and
the structure of legal institutions, but also the content of particular judicial opinions, legislative acts, administrative rulings,
and executive orders.
Frequently, however, what is meant by "neutrality in the law"
is far from clear.3 What quality in law does "neutrality" describe? What does it mean to say that a legal institution or a particular juridical act is "neutral"? Does it refer only to the identity
of the decision maker, the nature of the forum, and the procedures employed? Does it refer also to the kinds of argument that
will be entertained and advanced in support of the ultimate decision? Finally, does "neutrality in the law" relate to the actual
resolution of the dispute, the content of the decision itself?
To put the matter more concretely, suppose that the state
criminally prohibits the consumption of a certain hallucinogenic substance. Suppose further that a group of individuals
ingest this drug as part of a ritual that is central to their firmly
held religious beliefs. 4 Does neutrality demand that the state
refrain from banning the substance? If so, does the state violate
the principle of neutrality by forbidding the consumption of
any particular substance? Could the state, in a neutral fashion,
ban the use of the drug for some purposes but not for others?
For example, would the state violate the principle of neutrality
if it recognized a religious exemption from the general ban5 or
if it permitted consumption of the drug for medical purposes
but not for recreational use?6

common theme of liberal thought is that the state must not favor any comprehensive doctrines and their associated conception of the good."); MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 4
(1996) ("The political philosophy by which we live is a certain version of liberal
political theory. Its central idea is that government should be neutral toward the
moral and religious views its citizens espouse.").
3. See Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose,88 VA. L. REV. 87, 128 & n.139 (2002)
(arguing that neutrality understood as neutrality "toward all contested ideas of
the good" is incoherent and so "must be defended at a lower level of abstraction,"
but that, below the high level of abstraction defended by liberal theorists, "neutrality can stand for so many different political conceptions that it cannot resolve
any actual controversy about religion or anything else").
4. Cf. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
5. Cf. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
6. Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2005).
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Likewise, consider a state-created social assistance program
7
that provides subsistence benefits to qualified individuals.
Would the very existence of such a program violate the principle of neutrality? That is, would the act of drawing a distinction between individuals who are "qualified" and those who
are not, with the attendant provision of resources to the former
and not to the latter, mean that the state is acting in a nonneutral fashion? If the state later terminates the benefits it once
provided by means of a summary administrative decision, has
it then violated the principle of neutrality? What if the state official assigned to determine the merits of an application for
benefits knew or was somehow related to the applicant? Would
neutrality then demand the use of another decision maker or
the use of an entirely different method for making the determination? If, instead, the state were to make the award or denial
of benefits based upon a public hearing, what would a neutral
proceeding look like? What would constitute a neutral set of
adjudicative procedures? For example, would neutrality be satisfied if the rules allowed for the presentation of evidence and
the cross-examination of witnesses? Would the rules be neutral
if the proceeding permitted but did not require representation
by counsel? What would constitute a neutral burden of proof?
And how could the state satisfy neutrality in allocating this
burden between the parties?
Lastly, with respect to the ongoing dispute concerning the
legal status that should be afforded same-sex relationships,
some have argued that the laws that define marriage in a traditional sense are not neutral, but are in fact discriminatory
against same-sex couples. 8 Indeed, some contend that "just as
there was no neutral way for liberal theory to justify prohibiting interracial marriage yesterday, so there is no neutral way to
7. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255-56, 256 n.1 (1970).
8. This, of course, was one of the principal grounds adopted by the Supreme Ju-

dicial Court of Massachusetts in striking down and refashioning Massachusetts's
definition of marriage. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,
959-60, 968 (Mass. 2003). Other courts have recognized the right of same-sex cou-

ples to marry or to receive the same benefits as opposite-sex couples on similar
grounds. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 440-41, 451-52 (Cal. 2008); Lewis
v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 200 (N.J. 2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867-68 (Vt.
1999). But see Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003);
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind.Ct. App. 2005); Conaway v. Deane, 932
A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); Anderson v.
King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).
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justify prohibiting same-sex marriage today."9 Claims of this
sort demand either that the meaning of "neutrality" be clarified
or that the concept be abandoned. Is the state acting in a neutral fashion by limiting marriage to couples composed of one
man and one woman? Does it violate neutrality by requiring
the marital partners to be of a certain age? Does neutrality demand that the legal status of marriage be extended to include
relationships where the partners involved are of the same sex?
Does neutrality require the state to recognize the existence of
such relationships simply because the parties desire such recognition? Would the law be neutral if marriage were available
to groups of three or more individuals? The law recognizes a
wide variety of other relationships, such as employer and employee, buyer and seller, doctor and patient, parent and child.
Moreover, significant legal consequences often follow from the
recognition bestowed upon these relationships. Does neutrality
demand that the state ignore these relationships such that they
no longer function as categories within our legal system? Must
the state treat every relationship exactly alike regardless of its
content or the identity of the persons involved? 10
That the answers to at least some of these questions are not
immediately apparent suggests that the concept of neutrality is
in need of some elaboration. In the Article that follows, I seek
to clarify what "neutrality in law" means in two basic, though
sometimes disparate, jurisprudential perspectives.
The first perspective is liberalism, precisely because it is liberal theory that so keenly insists on the importance of neutrality in law. Beyond this, however, the meaning of neutrality in
liberal thought warrants especially close attention for a number
of reasons. First, as a historical matter, liberalism as a jurisprudential perspective has provided the intellectual foundation for
much of the American legal system. Indeed, liberalism has
been "the dominant secular approach to matters of government

9. William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419,
1423 (1993).
10. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Ending Marriageas We Know It,32 HOFSTRA L. REV.

201, 202 (2003) (" advocate here a more sweeping reform, incorporating recognition in every area of law of the diversity of adult relationships characterized by
emotional intimacy and economic interdependence. The law should no longer
reward marriage above all other relationships.").
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and society in the West for at least the past four centuries.""
Despite the frequent claim that we now live in a "post-liberal"
2
age, this continues to be the case. Second, as noted above,
many of liberalism's most thoughtful proponents contend that
the idea of neutrality is central to the liberal project. If neutrality is "the organizing principle of liberal thought," as some insist, 13 then examining liberal theory should prove fruitful in
understanding the meaning of "neutrality in law." Third, despite the tendency of many legal scholars to embrace ideas borrowed from one or another jurisprudential school of thought,
liberalism remains the dominant point of view among legal
academics. Notwithstanding the wide variety of intellectual
perspectives available, liberalism remains the philosophy with
which all serious reflection on American law must contend.
Of course, there has never been "any single, authoritative version of liberalism." 4 Rather, liberalism is an intellectual tradition, that is, "an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental agreements are defined and redefined"
through a process of responding to external critiques and internal interpretive disputes. 5 As such, liberalism has developed
through the contributions of many thoughtful commentators' 6 far too many to attempt to address in a detailed and comprehensive fashion within the confines of a single article. In the Article
that follows I will, from time to time, make reference to one or
another particular author within the liberal tradition. Nonetheless, as a template for the exposition of liberal neutrality gener-

11. Frank J. Garcia, Building a Just Trade Order for a New Millennium, 33 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1015, 1021 (2001) (citing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM,

at xxii-xxiv (1993)); see also Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1059, 1074 (1980) (describing liberalism as "the dominant ideology in the
modem Western world, an ideology that pervades our views of human nature
and of social life").
12. See supranote 2.
13. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10 (1980).
14. ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13

(1985); see also JOHN KEKES, AGAINST LIBERALISM 1 (1997) (arguing that liberalism
cannot be identified with "a set of necessary and sufficient conditions," a fact that
even proponents of liberalism acknowledge).
15. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 12 (1988).
16. See generally id. at 326-48. Indeed, in addition to those liberals who generally
support an expansive government such as Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman, and
John Rawls, the liberal tradition also includes libertarians such as Robert Nozick,
Richard Epstein, and Randy Barnett.
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ally, I will make use of Andrew Altman's splendid summary of
17
the main currents of liberal legal thought.
The second perspective on legal neutrality that I wish to explore is the one offered by the body of papal encyclicals, conciliar documents, episcopal statements, and other magisterial
texts collectively known as modem Catholic social teaching.18
The documents that make up this teaching have addressed a
number of topics, including the plight of the poor and working
classes; 19 the problems of economic justice posed by international trade and globalization; 20 the nature of the family and the
need to protect its place in society; 21 the morality of abortion,
euthanasia, and capital punishment; 22 the treatment of ethnic

17. ANDREW ALTMAN, CRMCAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990).

18. As Kenneth Himes has noted, "[t]he designation of modern teaching is a customary way of dating those teachings that begin with the promulgation of Rerum
Novarum in 1891 by Leo XIII." Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M., Introduction to MODERN
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: COMMENTARIES AND INTERPRETATIONS 2-3 (Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M., ed., 2005) [hereinafter MODERN CATHOLIC]. At the same
time, as William Murphy has observed, "Catholic social teaching certainly did not
begin with the appearance of Rerum Novarum on May 15, 1891. Social doctrine has
been a constant element of the Church's life from the beginning; it is the logical
application of Catholic philosophical and theological thought to the questions of
person and society." William Murphy, Rerum Novarum, in A CENTURY OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: ESSAYS ON 'RERUM NOVARUM' AND NINE OTHER KEY
DOCUMENTS 1 (George Weigel & Robert Royal eds., 1991).
19. Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter, Rerum Novarum (May 15, 1891) [hereinafter
Rerum Novarum], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY
HERITAGE 14 (David J.O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992) [hereinafter
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT], available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/leo-xiii/
encyclicals/documents/hfl-xiii enc 15051891_rerum-novarum_en.html; Pope
John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Laborem Exercens (Sept. 14, 1981) [hereinafter
Laborem Exercens], reprintedin CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra, at 352, available
at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/encyclicals/documents/hf.jpii enc_14091981_laborem-exercensen.html.
20. Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (Dec. 30, 1987)
[hereinafter Sollicitudo Rei Socialis], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra
note 19, at 395, available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/
encyclicals/documents/hfjp-ii enc 30121987_sollicitudo-rei-socialisen.html.
21. Pope John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation, Familiaris Consortio (Nov. 22, 1981)
[hereinafter Familiaris Consortio], available at http://www.vatican.va/holyjfather/
john-paul-ii/apost-exhortations/documents/hjp-ii exh 19811122_familiarisconsortioen.html; Pope John Paul II, Letter to Families, Gratissimam Sane (Feb. 2,
1994) [hereinafter Gratissimam Sane], available at http://www.vatican.va/holyjather/
john-pauLii/letters/documents/hf-jp-ii-let 02021994_familiesen.html.
22. Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Evangelium Vitae (Mar. 25, 1995) [hereinafter Evangelium Vitae], available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john paulii/
encyclicals/documents/hf-jp-ii-enc_25031995_evangelium-vitaeen.html.
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and racial minorities, immigrants, and refugees; 23 and relations
among peoples and nation-states and the need to build authentic peace in a world often savaged by war.24 Although these
documents have long been a fruitful source of reflection and
commentary for theologians, 2 over the past several years they
have drawn the attention of a growing number of legal scholars. Legal academic interest in the Catholic social tradition has
given rise to the creation of a journal dedicated to the subject, 26
to numerous articles in established law reviews, 27 and to books
and chapters in volumes exploring the relationship between
law and religious discourse.28 Although it would be an exaggeration to say that the official texts that make up Catholic social teaching offer a systematic treatment of jurisprudence, in
addressing various problems of modem social life these texts
do set forth a number of foundational principles concerning the
purpose of law, the nature of legal obligation, and the relationship between law and morality.

23. Nat'l Conference of Catholic Bishops, Pastoral Letter, Brothers and Sisters to Us
(1979), available at http://www.ojspm.org/majordoc us-bishops statementsbrothers_
andsisters.aspx.
24. Pope John XXIII, Encyclical Letter, Pacem in Terris (Apr. 11, 1963) [hereinafter
Pacem in Terris], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 19, at 131,
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john xxiii/encyclicals/documents/
hf.j-xxiii enc_11041963_pacem.en.html; Nat'l Conference of Catholic Bishops,
Pastoral Letter, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response (1983), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 19, at 492.
25. See, e.g., ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: CELEBRATION
AND CHALLENGE (John A. Coleman, S.J., ed., 1991); READINGS IN MORAL THEOL-

OGY NO. 5: OFFICIAL CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING (Charles E. Curran & Richard A.

McCormick, S.J., eds., 1986).
26. Although founded as an interdisciplinary publication, the Journal of Catholic
Social Thought is published at Villanova University School of Law. Moreover, the
Dean of Villanova's law school, Mark Sargent, was instrumental in the creation of
this journal and in inviting many legal academics to contribute to its pages.
27. A representative sample of this scholarship includes Vincent D. Rougeau, A
Crisis of Caring: A Catholic Critique of American Welfare Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 101 (2003); Lucia A. Silecchia, Environmental Ethics from the Perspectives of
NEPA and Catholic Social Teaching: Ecological Guidancefor the 21st Century, 28 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 659 (2004); Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle
of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103 (2001). For a convenient list of
additional sources, see THE CATHOLIC DIMENSIONS OF LEGAL STUDY: THE CATHOLIC
UNIVERSITY COLUMBUS SCHOOL OF LAW ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (2d ed. 2004).

28. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001); RECOVERING SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS: CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES
ON AMERICAN LAW (Michael A. Scaperlanda & Teresa Stanton Collett eds., 2007).
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The texts at the heart of the Catholic social tradition often
make use of the Hebrew and Christian scriptures. These works,
however, are not primarily exercises in biblical interpretation.
They are instead an often subtle amalgam of scriptural exegesis, theological reflection, and philosophical reasoning. 29 Accordingly, it would be wrong to see the legal commentary that
makes use of Catholic social thought as an effort to infuse the
law with a specifically religious content. Indeed, the critiques
of existing legal structures, doctrines, and concepts derived
from this tradition accord with the demands of public reason,
properly understood.
Part I of this Article sets forth the four varieties of liberal
neutrality Altman identifies, namely, what he calls "rights neutrality," "epistemological neutrality," "political neutrality," and
"legal neutrality." Part II sets forth in detail how Catholic social
teaching regards each of these kinds of neutrality. On the practical level-with respect to the existence and enforcement of
legal rights, the structures of democratic government, and the
need for an independent and unbiased judiciary-Catholic social thought and liberal theory have much in common. They
often differ, however, with respect to the reasons that support
and justify these well-established features of the modem state.
Moreover, as might be expected, the theoretical foundations of
Catholic social teaching that challenge the underlying premises
of liberal theory also have practical consequences-consequences
that this Article will explore in the pages that follow.
This Article is not an exercise in comparative law in the
strictest sense. It does not constitute an analysis of how the legal doctrines or statutory schemes of different countries address a common social problem." It is, however, an exercise in
comparative jurisprudence. As such, it provides us with the
hope and the opportunity of closely examining something so
familiar to us that it often goes unnoticed, of seeing what we
29. Cf. John R. Donohue, S.J., The Bible and Catholic Social Teaching: Will This Engagement Lead to Marriage?,in MODERN CATHOLIC, supra note 18, at 9 ("The social
teaching was based almost exclusively on the Catholic natural law tradition mediated primarily through Scholastic philosophy and theology, though later enhanced by dialogue with contemporary social ethics.").
30. Cf. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE INWESTERN LAW 1 (1987)
(noting that "legal scholars often use comparative law, just as they sometimes
consult history, to see how legal systems of the past or present have dealt with
problems similar to ours").
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often take for granted from a new vantage point-in T.S. Eliot's
famous phrase, "to arrive where we started and know the place
for the first time." 31 Beyond this, the ultimate point of this extended comparison is not simply to obtain a deeper appreciation of what liberalism has to say concerning the meaning of
neutrality in law, but to begin to imagine a different conception
of neutrality and a different way of envisioning the modem
secular state.
I.

FOUR KINDS OF LIBERAL NEUTRALITY

A convenient place to begin this discussion is with Professor
Andrew Altman's thoughtful and spirited defense of liberal
legal theory, a defense he offers against the assault made by
Critical Legal Studies.3 2 Altman identifies "four forms of neutrality that are defended within the liberal tradition": "rights
neutrality," "epistemological neutrality," "political neutrality,"
and "legal neutrality." 33
Among these four, the most fundamental is undoubtedly
"rights neutrality" because, as Altman bluntly states, "[w]hat
counts for liberalism is the commitment to substantial con-

31. T.S. ELIOT, Little Gidding, in COLLECTED POEMS 1909-1962, at 222 (1974); cf.
Ginter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 411, 411-12 (1985) (arguing that comparative law "is somewhat like
traveling" in that it "promises opportunities for learning both about one's own
country and culture and about other countries and cultures").
32. Critical Legal Studies refers to a movement in legal scholarship that flourished from the late 1970s through the 1990s. Some of the common themes advanced by the scholars identified with this movement include a biting critique of
legal and social hierarchies, the argument that all law is inextricably political in
nature, and a belief that the ineluctable indeterminacy of legal texts undermines
claims regarding the rule of law. For an early bibliography of works by these
scholars, see Duncan Kennedy & Karl E. Klare, A Bibliographyof CriticalLegal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984). See generally THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987).
33. ALTMAN, supra note 17, at 72-77. Although logically distinct, these four varieties of neutrality are not wholly independent of one another. For example, in
his discussion of the different kinds, Altman makes clear that epistemological
neutrality is concerned with the justification for rights neutrality and the principled distinction between the right and the good. He also makes clear that political
neutrality is strictly subordinate to rights neutrality. Furthermore, the four kinds
of neutrality are often linked together in liberal discourse.
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straints on politics in the name of individual autonomy." 34
Rights neutrality embodies just this sort of commitment. Moreover, in different ways it also embodies the distinction between
"the right" and "the good" as well as the distinction between
"law" and "politics."
As Altman makes clear, in the liberal tradition "rights" demarcate those "domains of human experience and activity that
are beyond the legitimate reach of the state." 3 These areas of
life "are not to be subject to the processes of deliberation, compromise, and negotiation that constitute the normal political
life of the liberal state." 36 Instead, rights define "the boundaries
of permissible politics." 37 If the state were to intrude beyond
these boundaries, it would not only cause harm to the individuals affected, but it would also call into question the very
reason for the creation and recognition of the state in the first
instance. Consequently, the state must remain neutral with respect to the exercise of individual rights precisely because they
"involve matters that are not legitimate subjects for the concern

34. Id. at 75. There is in fact an intramural dispute among liberal theorists over
whether autonomy or equality is the value most central to liberalism. See KEKES,
supra note 14, at 12-15 (comparing "classical liberalism," which emphasizes the
value of freedom from external interference, with "egalitarian liberalism," which
stresses not only freedom but the redistribution of resources to ensure equality of
opportunity). Compare RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 191-92 (1985)
[hereinafter DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE] (arguing that "liberalism takes as
its constitutive political morality" the "theory of equality [that] supposes that
political decisions must be, so far as possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life"), and RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 273 (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-

OUSLY] (arguing that "the liberal conception of equality" holds that the government may not distribute goods unequally or restrain liberty "on the ground that
one citizen's conception of the good life of one group is nobler or superior to another's"), with LARMORE, supra note 2, at 42-68 ("Liberalism... has generally been
associated with the ideal of freedom.... [This has been a mixed blessing because of
all the different things that 'freedom' can mean. One distinct advantage of making
neutrality the primary ideal of liberalism is that it explains what freedom has generally meant for the political iberal.... [N]eutrality emphasizes the equal freedom
that all persons should have to pursue their conception of the good life."), and JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 37-39 (1993) (arguing, contrary to Dworkin, that liberty is the central value in liberalism because
"equality of respect... cannot be understood in this context except by reference to a
conviction about the importance of liberty (for everyone)").
35. ALTMAN, supra note 17, at 72-73.

36. Id. at 72.
37. Id. at 73.
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and regulation of the political community." 38 They are "beyond
the bounds of legitimate politics." 39 As prominent examples of
the kinds of rights that liberal theory has traditionally supported, Altman briefly mentions the right to freedom of conscience and the right to private property. 40 In surveying the
contemporary liberal landscape, freedom of expression and
sexual liberty also readily leap to mind.
The second kind of neutrality that Altman identifies he calls
"epistemological neutrality." This variety of neutrality is closely
related to the first in that it is concerned with what constitute
"acceptable arguments for the principles that are alleged to demarcate the boundaries of permissible politics." 41 As rights neutrality makes clear, these boundaries lie between those areas of
life protected by rights, and thus free from interference by the
state, and all other areas of life, which are "legitimate subjects
for the concern and regulation of the political community." 42 In
other words, "epistemological neutrality" is the idea that liberal theory must be neutral not only in the freedoms and political structures it recommends, but also in the thinking that lies
behind these recommendations.
The third variety of liberal neutrality Altman identifies, "political neutrality," is concerned with the "institutional arrangements" of government. Political neutrality means that the
legislative procedures used to establish public policy must
"guarantee that political power ... is sufficiently widespread
and equalized" so that no one group may dominate the political scene and impose its vision of the good on society as a
38. Id.
39. Id. This way of describing rights enjoys some support in American law. See
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("The very purpose
of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."); see also LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22 (3d ed. 2000) (seeing the "outlines
of an answer" to why the Constitution would restrict the policy preferences of
current majorities in an experiment in which pigeons were found sometimes to
prefer to "bind their 'own future freedom of choice' in order to reap the rewards
of acting in ways that would elude them under the pressures of the moment"
(quoting G. W. Ainslie, Impulse Control in Pigeons, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
BEHAV. 485 (1974))).
40. ALTMAN, supra note 17, at 73.

41. Id.
42. Id.
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whole. 4 These arrangements must "insure that no single group
or fixed coalition can gain lasting control of the power of government." 44 Instead, the institutions of government should
"embody some fair set of procedures that compel different
groups, each having its own controversial moral and political
views, to compromise and negotiate with one another." 45 Only
by engaging in the "processes of normative compromise and
accommodation" may a group hope "to exercise significant influence over the deployment of state power." 46
The fourth and final type of liberal neutrality that Altman
identifies is "legal neutrality." It concerns neutrality in adjudication. 47 Legal neutrality means that, absent some superseding
individual right, judges may not revisit what the political process has already settled. That is, if the legislature has enacted
"some particular rule, then the rule [must be] interpreted and
applied.., in a way that is insulated from the influence of any
fresh assessment of the contending normative views." 4 Accordingly, judges and other officials deciding matters in an adjudicative setting must act in a neutral fashion by refraining
from the exercise of simple political choice. Altman notes that
this kind of neutrality plainly envisions a fairly strict separa49
tion between the realm of "law" and the realm of "politics."
Behind the four varieties of liberal neutrality in law (and
rights neutrality in particular) lies a further conceptual distinction crucial to liberal thought: the distinction between "the
right" and "the good." As Altman explains, arguments concerning the right and the good each involve a distinct set of
"normative directives, or values." Whereas the right "concerns
the demands of justice and moral obligation," the good "concerns the ends we should strive for, once we have insured that
we are living above the moral threshold set by the require43. Id. at 76.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 87.
46. Id. at 76.
47. Indeed, the expression "adjudicative neutrality" more accurately describes
the kind of neutrality Altman has in mind, namely, neutrality in the application of
settled rules of decision by courts and tribunals. "Legal neutrality" is too broad a
term because both "rights neutrality" and "political neutrality" plainly involve
law and legal institutions.
48. ALTMAN, supra note 17, at 76.

49. Id. at 76-77.
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ments of justice and moral obligation."50 Liberalism traditionally has held that judgments regarding the good -identifying
the ends in life worthy of pursuit -are subjective, such that "no
conception of the good licenses those who embrace it to coerce
those who dissent." 51 In other words, because the nature of the
good is unsettled, contested, and always open to dispute, liberalism holds that it is never appropriate to use the coercive
power of the state to mandate a particular theory of the good.
By contrast, "liberalism does not deny the legitimacy of coercion or the applicability of the concept of objective truth when
it comes to matters of the right." 52 Thus, the distinction between the right and the good gives rise to liberal neutrality in
its most basic sense: "[Tihe state must be neutral among all
(and only) those normative conceptions that endorse ways of
life actually above the threshold of right and justice" 53 where
right and justice are themselves defined in a way that is independent of any notion of goodness.
II.

FOUR COMMITMENTS IN CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT

Catholic social teaching has a great deal to say in response to
each of these four varieties of neutrality, both by way of support and by way of critique. The sections that follow address
each of these kinds of neutrality in turn.
A.

The Status of Rights in Catholic Social Thought

For at least some commentators, it seems, the Catholic Church
does not have a reputation for championing individual rights.
Some view it as a backward institution- anti-democratic, patriarchal, authoritarian, and dedicated to the suppression of individual freedoms.54 In the eyes of these critics, the Church surely
50. Id. at 66-67.
51. Id. at 67.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 70.
54. See, e.g., James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to
Child Welfare and Education Laws As Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1321, 1344 (1996) (asserting that the Catholic
Church "remains notoriously patriarchal"); Roy Lucas, New Historical Insights on
the Curious Case of Baird v. Eisenstadt, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 9, 44 (2003)
("The Roman Catholic Church still has not made great gains in accepting human
liberty, gender equality, and privacy, preferring authoritarian control instead.").
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has a reputation inferior to that of the United Nations, Amnesty International, the American Civil Liberties Union, and
other groups that typically enjoy wide praise for their efforts in
promoting individual rights.
Notwithstanding this sentiment, by any reasonable estimation, the Catholic Church must be counted among the institutions on Earth most dedicated to supporting human rights. 55
This support is most evident in the praxis of the Church-the
work that Catholics undertake around the world in caring for
people who suffer from a loss of rights and basic human dignity. Whether tending to the needs of migrants and refugees,
providing medical services and hospice care for those who suffer from HIV/AIDS, or supplying food, shelter, and education
to those who have none, the Catholic Church shows her profound dedication to "the least of these" ss and to the realization
57
of their rights in the concrete circumstances of everyday life.
The tremendous effort of many Catholics, whether lay or ordained, who work on behalf of those who suffer from a denial
of rights is at least in part a response to Catholic social teaching. Although the Church once employed the language of
This decidedly unflattering view of the Catholic Church enjoys a long lineage in
American thought. See generally JOHN T. MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERI-

(2003).
55. See, e.g., Gregory R. Beabout & Mary Catherine Hodes, John PaulIIon the Relationship Between Civil Law and the Moral Law: UnderstandingEvangelium Vitae in Light of
the Principleof Subsidiarity and the Moral Grammar of John Paul II, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 71, 91 (2007) (observing that "the Roman Catholic Church has
shifted from nineteenth century suspicion about the use of rights language to a
twenty-first century position where the Vatican is perhaps the world's most articulate
advocate of human rights"); Louis-Lhon Christians, Religious Law and Secular Law in
Democracy: The Evolutions of the Roman Catholic DoctrineAfter the Second Vatican Council,
2006 BYU L. REV. 661, 662 ("During the Second Vatican Council, the Roman Catholic
Church transformed itself from a vigorous defender of the ancien regime 'into one of
the world's leading advocates of social and political justice, democratic governance,
and human rights."' (quoting Zachary R. Calo, Catholic Social Thought, Political Liberalism, and the Idea of Human Rights 1 (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.samford.edu/lilyhumanrights/papers/CaloCatholic.pdf)).
56. Matthew 25:40.
57. Through her schools, hospitals, social service agencies, and various parish
and diocesan programs, the Catholic Church feeds the poor, offers aid to the
victims of disasters, responds to the needs of migrants and refugees, and cares
for more people with H1V/AIDS than any other organization in the world. For a
summary of the work of Catholic Charities in the United States, see CATHOLIC
CHARITIES USA, POVERTY IN AMERICA 2007: BEYOND THE NUMBERS (2007),
http://www.catholiccharitiesusa.org/NetCommunity/Document.Doc?id=566.
CAN FREEDOM: A HISTORY
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the papal and other magisterial docu-

58. Although the language of rights is now a mainstay of Catholic social teaching, this has not always been the case. The theoretical and practical challenges to
the Christian faith posed by both Enlightenment thought and the radical practices
of the newfound secular state made the Church suspicious of the language of
rights. For an overview of this period in church history, see ALEC R. VIDLER, THE
CHURCH IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTION (1971). For an especially poignant account of
one encounter between a group of Catholic women and the revolutionary regime
in France, see WILLIAM BUSH, To QUELL THE TERROR: THE MYSTERY OF THE VOCATION OF THE SIXTEEN CARMELITES OF COMPItGNE GUILLOTINED JULY 17, 1794
(1999). Although the Church today remains highly critical of the intellectual
currents generated by the Enlightenment, especially the various anthropologies
that trace their roots to that historical epoch, see, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Centesimus Annus 9113 (May 1, 1991) [hereinafter Centesimus Annus],
reprintedin CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 19, at 439, 448-49, available at
http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/john-paul-ii/encyclicals/documents/hf-jpii enc 01051991_centesimus-annus-en.html (criticizing the "mechanistic" view of
human and social reality put forth by the Enlightenment), she has embraced the
language of rights in her teaching.
Although some contend that the older Catholic language of "duty" and "virtue"
found in Thomistic thought can be translated into the language of rights, see
Daniel Finn, Commentary on Centesimus Annus, in MODERN CATHOLIC, supra note
18, at 436, 446-47, or can otherwise be understood as congruent with the Catholic
tradition, see David Hollenbach, S.J., A Communitarian Reconstruction of Human
Rights: Contributions from Catholic Tradition, in CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 127 (R. Bruce Douglass &
David Hollenbach eds., 1994) (interpreting the Catholic tradition as supporting a
communitarian construction of human rights); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS 198-226 (1980), others believe that there are still "unresolved
elements in the church's struggle with modem individualism and liberalism."
John Langan, S.J., Human Rights in Roman Catholicism, in READINGS IN MORAL
THEOLOGY NO. 5, supra note 25, at 110, 120-21 (noting that Catholicism contains a
deep desire "for a more unified, more cohesive, more disciplined form of society
than prevails in the secularized West" and the fear "that liberalism errs in giving
too much room to individual freedom at the expense of the common good"); see
also Kenneth L. Grasso, Beyond Liberalism: Human Dignity, the Free Society, and the
Second Vatican Council, in CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND COMMUNITARIANISM:
THE CATHOLIC INTELLECTUAL TRADITION AND THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRACY 29, 48 (Kenneth L. Grasso et al. eds., 1995) (acknowledging the "Catholic
human rights revolution" in Catholic social thought, but concluding that the "liberal understanding of man, social and political life, and the human good is simply
incompatible" with the Church's perspective).
Perhaps the greatest challenge to a Catholic assimilation of the language of
rights comes from Alasdair MacIntyre and David Schindler. See Alasdair Maclntyre, Community, Law, and the Idiom and Rhetoric of Rights, 26 LISTENING 96, 96-97
(1991) (arguing that "[t]he dominant contemporary idiom and rhetoric of rights
cannot serve genuinely rational purposes" and that in adopting the language of
rights Catholic bishops "may have injured their own case"); David L. Schindler,
Grace and the Form of Nature and Culture, in CATHOLICISM AND SECULARIZATION IN
AMERICA 10, 17 (David L. Schindler ed., 1990) (arguing that, in the liberal tradition, a right "is a claim which the self has on the other" such that the logic of
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ments that set forth Catholic social teaching now contain numerous references to the "universal and inviolable" rights of
the human person 9 and of the need for every state to establish
"an effective and independent system for the protection of
rights." 60 According to the Church, "the State must protect
natural rights, not destroy them," 61 such that when a government ventures to deny the exercise of rights that human beings
possess by their very nature, "it contradicts the very principle
of its own existence." 62 Thus, these rights take the form of immunity from coercion by the state and freedom to act without
interference from others. 63 The many rights recognized in the
Church's social teaching include: "the right to life, to bodily
integrity and to the means which are suitable for the proper
development of life," 64 the right of a man and a woman to
marry and establish a family 65 and "to have and to rear children through the responsible exercise of [their] sexuality," 66 the
rights "presupposes a primitive externality of relation between the self and the
other, which in turn makes the self the center of relation," and that this logic of
"self-centricity" is inimical to Christianity). For an excellent discussion of MacIntyre and Schindler's work in this regard, see TRACEY ROWLAND, CULTURE AND
THE THOMIST TRADITION AFTER VATICAN I 148-58 (2003).
59. SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTrIrUION ON THE
CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD, Gaudium et Spes 26 (Dec. 7, 1965) [hereinafter
Gaudium et Spes], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 19, at 166, 181,
availableat http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist-councils/iivatican-council/documents/
vat-iicons_19651207_gaudium-et-spesen.html; see also Pacem in Terris, supra
note 24, I 9.
60. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 1 75; see also Pacem in Terris, supra note 24,
62 (stating that "the rights of all should be effectively safeguarded and, if they
have been violated, completely restored").
61. Rerum Novarum, supra note 19, l 38.
62. Id.
63. Cf. SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, Dignitatis Humanae Personae 912 (Dec. 7, 1965) [hereinafter Dignitatis Humanae],
reprinted in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, 675 (Walter M. Abbott, S.J., ed., Joseph
Gallagher trans., 1966), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist-councils/
iivatican council/documents/vat-ii decl_19651207 dignitatis-humanaeen.html
(describing specifically the right to religious freedom).
64. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 1 11; see also Pope Paul VI, Encyclical Letter, Populorum Progressio 1 22 (Mar. 26, 1967) [hereinafter Populorum Progressio], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 19, at 240, 245, available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/paul-vi/encyclicals/documents/hfpvi enc_26031967populorumen.html (asserting that "each man has... the right
to find in the world what is necessary for himself").
65. Laborem Exercens, supra note 19, 9I 10; see also Pacen in Terris, supranote 24, ' 15.
66. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, T 47.
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right "to private initiative, to ownership of property and to
freedom in the economic sector," 67 the "right to work" 68 in a
69
safe environment and to receive the payment of a just wage so
as to have "the means to support oneself and one's dependents," 70 "the right to develop one's intelligence and freedom in
seeking and knowing the truth,"71 including "the right to a basic education and to technical and professional training," 72 "the
right "of professing a religion both privately and publicly," 73
including the right "to seek the truth" and "to adhere to the
truth, once it is known, and to order [one's] whole [life] in accord with the demands of truth," 74 the right to assemble and
associate and to express freely one's opinions;75 and the right
67. Id. J1 24. The right to private property has received considerable attention
throughout the history of modem Catholic social thought. See, e.g., Gaudium et
14-15; Pope John
69-71; Laborem Exercens, supra note 19,
Spes, supra note 59, 9191
XXIII, Encyclical Letter, Mater et Magistra 91 109-112 (May 15, 1961) [hereinafter
Mater et Magistra], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 19, at 84,
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ohnxxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf-jxxiii enc_15051961_mater en.html; Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 1 21-22; Populorum
Progressio,supranote 64, J[ 22-23; Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, QuadragesimoAnno
45-56 (May 15, 1931) [hereinafter QuadragesimoAnno], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 19, at 42, available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/
pius.xi/encyclicals/documents/hf-p-xi enc_19310515_quadragesimo-annoen.html;
5-10.
Rerum Novarum, supra note 19, 919
68. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 1 67.
69. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 11 18-20.
47. The right to a just wage sufficient to
70. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 91
support the whole family has been a constant theme in Catholic social thought
since Leo XIII. See Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 9 67; Laborem Exercens, supra note
19, 9119 (referring specifically to a "family wage" that is "a single salary given to
the head of the family for his work, sufficient for the needs of the family without
the spouse having to take up gainful employment outside the home"); Quadragesimo Anno, supra note 67, 1 71 ("[T]he wage paid to the working man should
be sufficient for the support of himself and of his family."); Rerum Novarum, supra
34-35 (stating that "the remuneration must be enough to support the
note 19, 9191
wage earner in reasonable and frugal comfort" that is "sufficient to enable him to
maintain himself, his wife, and his children in reasonable comfort").
71. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 147.
72. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 1 13.
73. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, T 73; see also Centesimus Annus, supra note 58,
147 (stating that religious freedom is in a certain sense "the source and synthesis
of all other rights"); Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 1 14.
74. Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 63, 9 2; see also Pacem in Terris, supra note 24,
14 (describing the right "to honor God according to the sincere dictates of [a
person's] own conscience, and therefore the right to practice [a person's] religion
privately and publicly").
75. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, J[ 73; Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 11 12, 23;
Rerum Novarum, supra note 19, 1 38.
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"to take an active part in public affairs and to contribute one's
76
part to the common good of the citizens."
This rather lengthy list of rights seems consistent with
Altman's account of rights neutrality in liberalism. A closer examination of the treatment of rights in Catholic social thought,
however, reveals three features that distinguish it from the
treatment of rights found in liberal theory.
1.

Rights as Less than Absolute

The first distinguishing feature is that although the Catholic
social tradition regards each of these rights as fundamental and
inalienable, it does not treat any of them as absolute. For example, the social teaching of the Church has made this point
specifically and repeatedly with respect to the right to own private property. As the late Pope John Paul II stated, the "Christian tradition has never upheld this right as absolute and untouchable." 77 Although Catholic social thought acknowledges
private property as an "expression of personality" and "an extension of human freedom" that can aid in the exercise of civil
liberties,78 private property "does not constitute for anyone an
absolute and unconditioned right." 79 The tradition holds that
all goods, and indeed the entire world, are given to humanity
in general80 such that "[t]he right to private property is subordinated to the right to common use, to the fact that goods are
meant for everyone." 81 Because "private property has a social
quality deriving from the law of the communal purpose of
earthly goods," 82 the state may regulate the use of private
property 83 and ensure that "the right to property must never be
exercised to the detriment of the common good." 84
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 126.
Laborem Exercens, supra note 19, 1 14.
Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 1 71.
Populorum Progressio,supra note 64, ' 23.
Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 1 30; Rerum Novarum, supra note 19, 9[ 7.
Laborem Exercens, supra note 19, ' 14.
Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 1 71.

83. For example, although Rerum Novarum states that one of the chief duties of
the state "is the safeguarding, by legal enactment and policy, of private property,"
Rerum Novarum, supra note 19, 9130, and that "private ownership must be held
sacred and inviolable," id. 9135, the encyclical also makes the distinction between

the right to own something and the right to use it as one pleases. Id. 1 19. Building
on this point, QuadragesimoAnno states that because "the right of ownership... is
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According to the Church's social teaching, rights even more
basic than the right of ownership - such as the right to life - are
not absolute and unqualified. Plainly, "[f]or man, the right to
life is the fundamental right."a5 Indeed, the Church acknowledges that the right to life enjoys a kind of logical priority over
other rights in that bodily life is a necessary condition for enjoying all other earthly goods.86 Still, even this most basic right
is not absolute. For example, an individual or the state may licitly take the life of another through an act of legitimate selfdefense. 87 In the case of public authorities who are responsible
for defending public order and ensuring people's safety and
well-being, "[l]egitimate defense can be not only a right but a
grave duty." 88 Thus, under certain well-defined circumstances,
the Church teaches that the state can take the life of someone
intent on harming others.
Likewise, even the right to religious liberty, which Pope John
Paul II described as "the source and synthesis"8 9 of other rights
and "the apex of development,"90 is subject to some qualification. As defined by the Second Vatican Council, the right to religious freedom includes both freedom from coercion, such that
"no one [may] be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own
beliefs," and freedom from restraint, such that one may act "in
accordance with his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly,
whether alone or in association with others."9 ' But even this
most solemn right is subject to the qualification that "the just
requirements of public order are observed." 92 Although the

not absolutely rigid" within the bounds of the natural law, the state "may specify
more accurately what is licit and what is illicit for property owners in the use of
their possessions." QuadragesimoAnno, supra note 67, 1 49.
84. Populorum Progressio,supra note 64, 9123.
85. POPE JOHN PAUL II, CROSSING THE THRESHOLD OF HOPE 204 (1994).
86. See SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION

9, 11 (1974) [hereinafter Quaestiode
ON PROCURED ABORTION, Quaestio de abortu 919
abortul, reprintedin VATICAN COUNCIL II: MORE POSTCONCILIAR DOCUMENTS (Aus-

tin Flannery, O.P., ed., 1982).
87. See Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22,

11 55-56.

88. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 9 2265 (1994).

89. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 9147.
90. Id. 1 29.
91. DignitatisHumanae, supra note 63, 1 2.
92. Id. The Declaration on Religious Freedom later defines "public order" as
government's responsibility to ensure an "effective safeguard of the rights of all
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Council stated that the right to religious freedom must "be respected as far as possible and curtailed only when and insofar
as necessary," 93 the Council clearly anticipated that there could
be instances in which the right may justly be restricted.
The Catholic social tradition does speak in terms of absolutes
with respect to certain forms of conduct. That is, the Church
regards certain actions as "intrinsically evil" in that they are
incapable of ordering the human person toward his or her authentic good. 94 As such, it is never morally licit to perform these
acts, even when done with the best of intentions. 95 Catholic social teaching holds that to fulfill its function as the guarantor of
public order and facilitator of the common good 96-indeed, in
order to preserve the integrity of law as such-the law must
prohibit some of these acts.97 In doing so, the Church often describes the freedom not to be victimized by the wrongful acts of
others as a "right" that should enjoy juridical status. At the same
time, the Church does not teach that every intrinsically wrongful
act must be subject to legal penalty. Indeed, prudential concerns
citizens and for peaceful settlement of conflicts of rights," "an adequate care of
genuine public peace," and "a proper guardianship of public morality." Id. 1 7.
93. Id. 7.
94. The Second Vatican Council discussed this point at some length in its Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modem World, concluding that
whatever is opposed to life itself, such as any type of murder, genocide,
abortion, euthanasia, or willful self-destruction, whatever violates the
integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, torments inflicted on
body or mind, attempts to coerce the will itself; whatever insults human
dignity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary imprisonment,
deportation, slavery, prostitution, the selling of women and children; as
well as disgraceful working conditions, where men are treated as mere
tools for profit, rather than as free and responsible persons; all these
things and others of their like are infamies indeed.
Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, at 1 27.
95. See Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Veritatis Splendor 91 79-83 (Aug. 6,
1993) [hereinafter Veritatis Splendor], available at http://www.vatican.va/holyjather/
john-paul-ii/encyclicals/documents/hf-jp-ii-enc06081993_veritatis-splendor-en.html.
96. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 1 71 (stating that "[tihe real purpose of civil
law is to guarantee an ordered social coexistence in true justice").
97. See, e.g., CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FArrH, INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN LIFE IN IS ORIGIN AND ON THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION, Donum
Vitae § 3 (Feb. 22, 1987) [hereinafter Donum Vitae], available at http://www.vatican.va/
romancuria/congregations/cfaith/documents/rcconcfaith doc_19870222_respectfor-human-lifeen.html ("As a consequence of the respect and protection which
must be ensured for the unborn child from the moment of his conception, the law
must provide appropriate penal sanctions for every deliberate violation of the
child's rights.").
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strongly suggest that law and morality should not be coextensive in many instances. 98 Thus, although Catholic social teaching
understands that the legal recognition and enforcement of moral
rights must, in certain instances, give way to the demands of
public order and the common good, certain legal duties-and
thus their correlative rights99 -must remain absolute. 0 0 Indeed,
if the state does not recognize and enforce certain rights always
and everywhere-such as the right of an innocent person not to
be killed by another individual or the state-then "the very
foundations of a State based on law are undermined."'' 1

98. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 71 (stating that "public authority can
sometimes choose not to put a stop to something which-were it prohibitedwould cause more serious harm"); see also Gregory A. Kalscheur, John Paul II, John
Courtney Murray, and the Relationship Between Civil Law and Moral Law: A Constructive Proposalfor Contemporary American Pluralism, 1 J. CATH. SoC. THOUGHT 231
(2004). Thus, for example, although the Church teaches that the practice of artificial contraception is intrinsically evil, see Veritatis Splendor, supra note 95, I180, it
does not teach that the state must prohibit the use of contraceptives in law.
99. Describing the freedom not to be subject to a certain form of conduct as a
"right" indicates the very terminological weakness surrounding the use of the
term that Hohfeld sought to correct. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
Suppose that the conduct at issue is murder. The use of the word "right" in this
manner is odd because the focus of the legal prohibition against murderous acts is
on the wrongdoer and not on the person wronged. In Hohfeldian terminology the
obligation not to murder others could be described as a "duty" correlative to
which is the "right" on the part of the would-be victim not to be killed. Likewise,
what we colloquially refer to as the "right to life" could in Hohfeldian terminology be described as a "privilege" enjoyed by all, correlative to which there is "no
right" to engage in murder. Moreover, the state has the "power" to prohibit murder, and those who violate this prohibition are subject to a correlative "liability."
See Curtis Nyquist, Teaching Wesley Hohfeld's Theory of Legal Relations, 52 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 238 (2002); Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudencefrom Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975.
100. See, e.g., Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 144 (asserting that the human person
is the subject of rights that "[n]ot even the majority of a social body may violate"); cf
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCFRINE OF THE FAITH, DOCTRINAL NOTE ON SOME QUESTIONS REGARDING THE PARTICIPATION OF CATHOLICS IN POLITICAL LIFE 15 (2002),

available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/
rc con cfaith doc 20021124_politicaen.html (remarking that "it cannot be denied
that politics must refer to principles of absolute value precisely because these are at the
service of the dignity of the human person and of true human progress").
47 (arguing that democracy must be
101. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 91
given "an authentic and solid foundation through the explicit recognition" of
rights, among the most important of which is "the right to life"); Donum Vitae,
supra note 97, § 3; see also Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 1 20 (arguing that a democracy that fails to acknowledge and safeguard the dignity of every human person "is betrayed in its very foundations" (emphasis omitted)).
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As a practical matter, given that not all rights are absolute,
the state may, for example, subject the right of religious expression to reasonable restrictions regarding the time, place, and
manner in which the expression is to take place. 10 2 Likewise,
the state may restrict the right of free speech where the speech
at issue presents an immediate threat to public safety. 10 3 The
state may not, however, permanently prohibit the dissemination of political views or the public expression of religious devotion because the very foundation of the state is to secure the
free exercise of these rights. 1°4
In light of this qualification, some might object that this alleged difference is illusory. Some proponents of liberalism may
argue that the simultaneous recognition of rights and the
treatment of those rights as "less than absolute" does not distinguish Catholic social thought from liberal theory. Some liberal theorists, however, such as Ronald Dworkin, describe
rights as "political trumps held by individuals," 10 5 such that the
government cannot "defeat such a right by appealing to the
right of a democratic majority to work its will."'0 6 For Dworkin,
the state "must not define citizens' rights so that these are cut
off for supposed reasons of the general good.' 0 7 Still, notwithstanding this rhetorical bravado, other committed liberals have
observed that the state "can infringe even the most fundamental rights if its justifications are sufficiently 'compelling' and
102. Cf.Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654
(1981) (upholding a rule that had the effect of restricting the distribution of reli-

gious literature at the Minnesota State Fair).
103. Cf.Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) (upholding the conviction of
a civil rights speaker and the power of the police to "prevent a breach of the peace"
where the speech "undertakes incitement to riot"); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 308 (1940) ("When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with

traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or
order, appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious.").
104. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 9160 (arguing that "[t]he chief concern of civil

authorities must.., be to ensure that these rights are acknowledged, respected,
coordinated with other rights, defended and promoted").
105. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 34, at xi; see also DWORKIN,
A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 34, at 198 (stating that for the liberal rights
"will function as trump cards held by individuals"); Ronald Dworkin, Rights as
Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153, 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) (arguing that

"[rights are best understood as trumps over some background justification for
political decisions that states a goal for the community as a whole").
106. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 34, at 194.

107. Id. at 204.
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the means used are the least restrictive available." 108 Under this
approach, one could zealously subscribe to the tenets of liberalism and still hold that a deeply cherished right, such as the
right to free speech under the First Amendment, may be overcome under certain circumstances. 1°9
As noted above, 1 0 liberalism has a long and rich history to
which many individuals have made significant contributions.
Although it is important to recognize the genuine diversity of
opinion that exists within liberal thought, the concept of "liberalism" is not so amorphous and protean as to be devoid of
meaning. Rather, it identifies a number of ideas, principles, and
values that coalesce together and argue for a certain kind of
social order. In showing that Catholic social teaching treats
rights as norms that are less than absolute, I have not demonstrated that Catholic social thought stands in opposition to all
liberal theory, only that it differs from some versions of liberalism with respect to this point."'
Beyond this disagreement with specific participants within
the liberal tradition, the difference is one of emphasis. The
forthright way in which the Church acknowledges the qualified nature of rights reflects a greater concern for the genuine
interests of the community than can be readily seen in the liberal conception of individual rights. It reflects an overt wariness toward the dangers of radical individualism.
2.

Rights and Duties

A second feature that more strongly distinguishes the treatment of rights found in Catholic social thought from liberal
theory is that, in Catholic social teaching, rights never stand

108. Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive
Harms, and Constitutionalism,27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 729 (1998).
109. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (recognizing the "clear and
present danger" standard in First Amendment cases). For a more contemporary
articulation of the standard which the government must satisfy to punish speech for
inciting violence, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (per curiam)
(holding that the state may restrict speech where the speaker intends to "incite imminent lawless action" and the words used are likely to produce this result).
110. See supra notes 11 and 16 and accompanying text.
111. For arguments that criticize Dworkin for conceptual inconsistency in his
discussions of rights, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of
Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343, 368-71 (1993); Richard H. Pildes, Dworkin's Two
Conceptions of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 309 (2000).
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alone. Rather, they are always accompanied by duties. 112 Indeed, this pairing of rights and duties appears throughout the
social tradition, beginning with the opening lines of Pope Leo
XIII's Rerum Novarum, the encyclical that ushered in the mod13
em era of Catholic social thought.
The very concept of a right is, in a sense, neutral in that the
right holder has the freedom to exercise it in one way or another. As Dean John Garvey has noted, we are taught that a
freedom is bilateral, like "a two-way street," where one is free
to travel in one direction or the other, and both "are equal in
value." 114 A duty, by contrast, is unidirectional. It is decidedly
non-neutral inasmuch as it denotes a definite end that one is
bound to pursue. Aside from the duty to respect the rights of
others," 5 discussion of duties is largely absent from liberal discourse.1 16 The individual's freedom to act, the freedom to plan
one's own life course which lies at the heart of liberal theory, is
thought best preserved by imposing on others the duty not to
interfere with the exercise of rights. Liberal duties are always
directed outward, toward another rights holder in the exercise
7
of his or her rights."
Catholic social thought clearly recognizes that the human
person has "the duty to respect the rights of others."" 8 Never112. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24,

30 (noting that "every fundamental human

right draws its indestructible moral force from the natural law, which in granting
it imposes a corresponding obligation").
113. See Rerum Novarum, supra note 19, 1 (stating that "[iut is not easy to define
the relative rights and the mutual duties of the wealthy and of the poor, of capital
and of labor").
114. JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 5 (1996). But see id. at 18 (arguing that "freedoms are not necessarily bilateral" and that whether they are "depends on the principles they revolve around").
115. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 170-72 (1986) (arguing that

rights are the "grounds" of duties and that rights are part of a "justification" for
duties, but rejecting the idea that a right to X may be reduced to a corresponding
duty to furnish the right holder with X).
116. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF

POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).

117. This was in fact one of Hohfeld's most insightful points, namely, that a jural relation is a pair of correlatives. Accordingly, how a legal relationship is described depends upon the point of view from which the description is made. One
person's "right" is another person's "duty," and one person's "power" is another
person's "liability." See supra note 99.
118. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58,

17; see also Pacern in Terris, supra note 24, 9130

(noting that "in human society to one man's right there corresponds a duty in all other
persons: the duty, namely, of acknowledging and respecting the right in question").
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theless, in teaching that rights and duties are "inseparably connected," 1 9 the social tradition goes beyond the limited correspondence between rights and duties reflected in liberal theory.
Rather, it teaches that the duties which accompany the various
rights of the human person are duties which have an inward
orientation. These duties address the proper exercise of rights
by the rights holder him or herself. Thus, as Pope John XXIII
set forth in Pacem in Terris, "the right of every man to life is correlative with the duty to preserve it; his right to a decent standard of living with the duty of living it becomingly; and his
right to investigate the truth freely, with the duty of seeking it
ever more completely and profoundly." 120 Other examples in
the tradition include the duty to work and the corresponding
right to decent and safe working conditions and a living
wage, 121 and the duty to use material goods both for one's own
benefit and "the benefit of others" and the corresponding right
1 22
to private ownership.
The notion that rights holders have duties, not only toward
others but also with respect to themselves, shows that duties
enjoy a kind of priority over rights in Catholic social doctrine.
On this point the Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae, is especially instructive.
The Council argued that every human being has a "personal
responsibility" and "a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth." 23 This obligation arises from the very
nature of the human person. Still, a person cannot be responsible unless he or she is also free. As the Council states, "men
cannot discharge these obligations.., unless they enjoy immunity from external coercion."' 24 Because of his nature, "every
man has the duty, and therefore the right, to seek the truth in
matters religious." 121 Rights need to be protected because
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 28.
Id. 29.
16-19.
See Laborem Exercens, supra note 19,
Rerum Novarum, supra note 19, 9 19.
DignitatisHumanae, supra note 63, 1 2.

124. Id.
125. Id. 1 3. John Courtney Murray makes a similar claim with respect to the Bill
of Rights in the American Constitution:

The philosophy of the Bill of Rights was also tributary to the tradition of
natural law, to the idea that man has certain original responsibilities
precisely as man, antecedent to his status as citizen. These responsibilities
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where their exercise is rendered ineffective "the fulfillment of
duties is compromised." 126 Thus, duties provide the grounds
and justification for rights-not the other way around, as some
liberal theorists contend. 127 This relationship between duties
and rights-the idea that obligations give rise to freedoms-is
admirably summarized by John Henry Cardinal Newman:
128
"Conscience has rights because it has duties."
Although duties enjoy a kind of priority over rights, the
Church's social doctrine makes plain that the enjoyment of a
right is not contingent upon the right holder fulfilling the correlative duty that accompanies it. For example, Dignitatis Humanae expressly states that the right to religious freedom-the
right to be free from coercion in the pursuit of truth"continues to exist even in those who do not live up to their
obligation of seeking the truth and adhering to it."129 This view
of rights and duties is undoubtedly compatible with the liberalism reflected in the American constitutional scheme. That is,
the "right to investigate the truth freely"' 130 is protected by the
First Amendment. 31 Under this broad constitutional freedom a
person may read the Bible, or reflect on the verses of the
Qur'an or the Bhagarad Gita, or investigate the works of Plato
and Aristotle, Hegel and Marx, Nietzsche and Sartre without

are creative of rights which inhere in man antecedent to any act of
government; therefore they are not granted by government and they cannot
be surrendered to government. They are as inalienable as they are inherent.
JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS

ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSMON 37 (1960). Other commentators are less confident

than Murray about the connection between natural law and natural rights. See,
e.g., Louis Dupr6, The Common Good and the Open Society, in CATHOLICISM AND
LIBERALISM, supra note 58, at 172, 180 (arguing that, although "the theory of rights
may be reinterpreted within the general context of natural law, its original individualism was far removed from the natural law's fundamental assumption of the
essentially social nature of the person" (citation omitted)).
126. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 1 63.
127. See RAZ, supra note 115, at 166 (saying that someone has a right means that
some aspect of a person's well-being "is a sufficient reason for holding some other
person(s) to be under a duty").
128. JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, A LETTER ADDRESSED TO HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF
NORFOLK, ON OCCASION OF MR. GLADSTONE'S RECENT EXPOSTULATION 75 (New
York, Catholic Publ'n Soc'y 1875).
129. DignitatisHumanae, supra note 63, 912.
130. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 9129.
131. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 19-29
(1982) (discussing the value of free speech in the process of discerning the truth).
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interference from the state. At the same time, a person does not
forfeit his or her First Amendment freedoms if, instead of fulfilling the duty to seek the truth ever more completely and profoundly, he or she seeks "to spend life in enjoyment as an end
in itself"'132 -a life of "self-love which leads to an unbridled affirmation of self-interest," 133 a life that indulges in the excesses
of the material consumption and exhibitionist culture that characterize much of Western society. Even if a person spends his
or her entire life moving from distraction to distraction, wholly
neglecting the duty to explore the fundamental question of
human existence-the question of meaning that lingers in
every human heart34-such a person nevertheless retains the
132. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 9 36.
133. Id. I 17.
134. The unavoidable question of the meaning of human existence is a persistent
theme in Catholic social teaching and in the Church's wider magisterial tradition.
See, e.g., Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 113 (noting how the rationalism and
mechanism of the Enlightenment cannot resolve "the contradiction in [man's]
heart between the desire for the fullness of what is good and his own inability to
attain it"); id. If 24 (observing that "[d]ifferent cultures are basically different ways
of facing the question of the meaning of personal existence" to which God is the
ultimate answer and that a system of thought which "promised to uproot the
need for God from the human heart" could not succeed without "throwing the
heart into turmoil"); Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Fides et Ratio 911 (Sept.
14, 1998) [hereinafter Fides et Ratio], available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/
john-paul-ii/encyclicals/documents/hfjp-ii-enc_15101998_fides-et-ratio en.htm
(describing "the fundamental questions which pervade human life: Who am I? Where
have I come from and where am I going? Why is there evil? What is there after this life?");
Pope Paul VI, Encyclical Letter, Octogesima Adveniens 9f140 (May 14, 1971) [hereinafter
Octogesima Adveniens], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 19, at 265,
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/paul-vi/apost-letters/documents/
hfLp-vi-apLl9710514_octogesima-adveniens en.html (noting that scientific knowledge "deepens rather than solves the mystery of the heart of man; nor does it provide the complete and definitive answer to the desire which springs from his in2 ("No one can escape from
nermost being"); Veritatis Splendor, supra note 95, 91
the fundamental questions: What must I do? How do I distinguish good from evil?");
id. 918 (adding that the question put by the young man to Jesus in Matthew 19:16
"is one which rises from the depths of his heart" and that "[it is an essential and
unavoidable questionfor the life of every man, for it is about the moral good which
must be done, and about eternal life"); see also Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 9110
(noting that "people are raising the most basic questions or recognizing them with a
new sharpness: What is man? What is this sense of sorrow, of evil, of death, which
continues to exist despite so much progress? What is the purpose of these victories,
purchased at so high a cost?... What follows this earthly life?"); id. 9121 (noting that
"every man remains to himself an unsolved puzzle, however obscurely he may perceive it"); id. 9141 ("For man will always yearn to know, at least in an obscure way,
what is the meaning of his life, of his activity, of his death."); SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE CHURCH To NON-
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right to religious freedom. The state may not force a person to
read Aristotle or Marx or the teachings of Calvin or Buddha as
the price, the quid pro quo, for retaining his or her constitutional right to seek the truth freely. 3 '
Because the enjoyment of a right is not contingent upon its
proper exercise by the right holder, many of the duties set forth
in Catholic social teaching are only moral duties. As set forth in
greater detail below, Catholic social thought provides that the
state may impose legal duties that are binding on its citizens
insofar as these duties are in accord with the common good
and do not compel immoral conduct. 136 The respective duties
incumbent upon right holders that accompany the various rights
37
set forth in Catholic social teaching cannot, however, be legal
in nature, as this would contradict the very idea of rights as protecting certain domains of human experience "beyond the legitimate reach of the state." 138 Thus, although the Church's social
doctrine speaks of rights and duties together as being "universal
and inviolable," 139 the duty of a person to exercise a specific right
in a particular way does not enjoy the same juridical status as
the right itself. Instead, the documents that make up the social
tradition indicate that, although these duties exert a binding
force on the human conscience, 14° they do not enjoy the force of
positive law.' 41 Moreover, aside from the problem of contradicCHRISTIAN RELIGIONS, Nostra Aetate 1 1 (Oct. 28, 1965) [hereinafter Nostra
Aetate], reprinted in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN H, supra note 63, at 660, available

at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist-councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/
vat-iidecl_19651028_nostra-aetateen.html ("Men look to the various religions for
answers to those profound mysteries of the human condition which, today even as in
olden times, deeply stir the human heart: What is a man? What is the meaning and
the purpose of our life? What is goodness and what is sin? What gives rise to our
sorrows and to what intent? Where lies the path to true happiness? What is the truth
about death, judgment, and retribution beyond the grave? What, finally, is that ultimate and unutterable mystery which engulfs our being, and whence we take our rise,
and whither our journey leads us?" (footnote omitted)).
135. Cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
136. See infra Parts II.A.3.b, II.C.2.
137. Altman uses the term "political duty," by which he means "a moral duty
that should be legally enforced." ALTMAN, supra note 17, at 137.
138. Id. at 72.
139. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, J[ 26.
140. See Veritatis Splendor, supra note 95, 1 59.
141. See, e.g., Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 9160 (acknowledging both rights and
duties and stating that rights must be "defended and promoted" while making no
similar statement regarding duties).
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tion, the Church's social tradition holds that the enforcement of
many of these duties would in any case prove ineffective. The
coercive power of the state cannot compel genuine belief in any
proposition -scientific, political, or religious-any more than it
142
can make one person love another.

Although the state cannot compel right holders to exercise
their rights so as to fulfill the duties that correspond to them,
Catholic social thought provides that these duties still enjoy a
kind of secondary juridical status-a status that runs contrary
to the liberal understanding of rights neutrality. The social tradition provides that these moral duties can serve as the impetus behind various kinds of non-coercive legal measures. That
is, consistent with the logic of rights, the state cannot demand
that citizens exercise a particular right in the few narrow ways
approved by the state. The state can, however, encourage the
fulfillment of moral duties for the good of the individual and
society as a whole. Thus, "[w]hile respecting the legitimate liberties of individuals, families, and subsidiary groups," the state
should act "in such a way as to create, effectively and for the
well-being of all, the conditions required for attaining man's
true and complete good.' 1

43

It is "demanded by the common

good that civil authorities should make earnest efforts to bring
about a situation in which individual citizens can easily exercise their rights and fulfill their duties as well." 144
Law can facilitate the fulfillment of natural duties which are
an essential component of the genuine good and happiness of
every human being, 145 not through direct intervention but
through indirect prompting that encourages rightful conduct.
As the Second Vatican Council stated, "government is more
often required to intervene in social and economic affairs, by
142. See, e.g., DignitatisHumanae, supra note 63, 911 (recognizing the duty to seek
and know the truth but observing that "[tihe truth cannot impose itself except by
virtue of its own truth, as it makes its entrance into the mind at once quietly and
with power"); id. 9110 (noting that "[tihe act of faith is of its very nature a free act"
such that it is "in accord with the nature of faith that in matters religious every
manner of coercion on the part of men should be excluded").
143. Octogesima Adveniens, supra note 134, 9146.
144. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 9163.
145. Cf. Pope Paul VI, Encyclical Letter, Humanae Vitae 31 (July 25, 1968) [hereinafter Humanae Vitae], available at http://www.vatican.va/holyjather/paul-vi/encyclicals/
documents/hf-p-vi-enc 25071968_humanae-vitaeen.html (asserting that "man
cannot attain that true happiness... unless he keeps the laws which the Most
High God has engraved in his very nature").
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way of bringing about conditions more likely to help citizens
and groups freely attain to complete human fulfillment with
greater effect." 146 Thus, for example, although the state may not
compel the observance of a religious practice because of the
inviolable right to religious freedom, government may "help
create conditions favorable to the fostering of religious life, in
order that the people may be truly enabled to exercise their religious rights and to fulfill their religious duties." 147 Likewise,
although everyone has a right to work,148 "[tihe state could not
directly ensure the right to work for all its citizens unless it
controlled every aspect of economic life and restricted the free
initiative of individuals." 149 Instead, the state should work to
"creat[e] conditions which will ensure job opportunities, by
stimulating those [business] activities where they are lacking or
by supporting them in moments of crisis." 5 ° Similarly, the state
cannot force people to marry or force spouses to fulfill the duties of marriage with respect to the begetting and raising of
children. 151 Indeed, because marriage and procreation are inalienable rights, "it is for the parents to decide, with full knowledge of the matter, on the number of their children." 52 Nevertheless, governments should "strive to create economic, social,
public health and cultural conditions which will enable married couples to make their choices about procreation in full
freedom and with genuine responsibility." 15 3 Thus, although
146. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59,

75; cf. Octogesima Adveniens, supra note 134,

1143 (noting that with respect to international development "the most important
duty in the realm of justice is to allow each country to promote its own development, within the framework of a cooperation free from any spirit of domination,
whether economic or political").
147. DignitatisHumanae, supra note 63, 6.
148. See Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, T 67.
149. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 9 48.
16-19 (describing the state as
150. Id.; see also Laborem Exercens, supra note 19, 9191
the "indirect employer" who can affect the conditions and circumstances under
which "direct employment" by private actors can take place).
151. See Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 9150 (referring to "the duty to procreate"); Humanae Vitae, supra note 145, 9 1 (referring to "[t]he transmission of human
life" as "a most serious role").
152. Populorum Progressio,supra note 64, 9 37.
153. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, T 91; see also Centesimus Annus, supra note
58, 9139 (noting that it is "a lack of freedom, which causes a person to reject a commitment to enter into a stable relationship with another person and to bring children into the world"); id. 149 (arguing that "[it is urgent.., to promote not only
family policies, but also those social policies which have the family as their prin-

HeinOnline -- 32 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 543 2009

544

HarvardJournal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 32

the state may not enforce the moral duties that correspond to
the rights of the human person, it may enact laws and promote
policies that aid and encourage people in the fulfillment of
their duties. 1 4
3.

The Good and the Right Reconsidered

The desire to foster the fulfillment of moral duties, and, thus,
the exercise of legal rights in a particular way, exposes the fault
line between Catholic social thought and liberal theory as described by Altman. Here, these two jurisprudential perspectives oppose one another in a significant way. In encouraging
the fulfillment of duties-that is, in identifying duties that correspond with particular rights-the state promotes a specific
conception of the good. This approach is not neutral because
the state recommends that a person's rights ought to be exercised in a certain way, which is sharply at odds with the liberal
claim that "the state must be neutral among all.., those normative conceptions that endorse ways of life actually above the
threshold of right and justice." 15 5 Because the duties fostered by
the state under Catholic social thought are not legal duties, the
specter of coercion is absent. Still, in fostering a certain vision
of the good through the fulfillment of these duties, Catholic
social thought violates the idea of state neutrality advocated by
many liberal theorists.
For example, Ronald Dworkin, perhaps the most celebrated
champion of liberal legal thought in the academy, has argued
that "government must be neutral on what might be called the
ciple object, policies which assist the family by providing adequate resources and
efficient means of support, both for bringing up children and for looking after the
elderly"); Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 52 ("Public authority should regard it
as a sacred duty to recognize, protect, and promote [families'] authentic nature, to
shield public morality, and to favor the prosperity of domestic life.").
154. The practice of encouraging the proper exercise of rights is already evident
in a wide array of practices in the United States. For example, although the Supreme Court has not been receptive to state attempts to punish "hate speech," see
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), this has not dissuaded states, municipalities, and governmental units such as school districts and universities from
working to promote the values of diversity, civility, and respect. Indeed, the
American experience shows that government can and should refrain from interfering with the exercise of rights, such as the right to free speech, but that it need
not be indifferent to the use of speech that is intended to demean or ridicule individuals based on their race, ethnic background, religion, or sexual orientation.
155. ALTMAN, supra note 17, at 70.
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question of the good life."1 56 Indeed, he contends that such neutrality is essential to liberalism. According to Dworkin, the "constitutive political morality" of liberalism' 57 is a theory of equality
that supposes "that political decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life, or
of what gives value to life." 5 8 Liberalism definitively rejects the
alternate view, which holds "that the content of equal treatment
cannot be independent of some theory about the good for man
or the good of life," that is, "a theory of what human beings
ought to be."' 59 The state "must not constrain liberty on the
ground that one citizen's conception of the good life of one
group is nobler or superior to another's." 16 0 Thus, liberalism demands a framework of substantive and procedural rights that
restrict the ways in which government may enact preferences for
one or another theory of the good. These rights "function as
trump cards held by individuals" that enable them "to resist
particular decisions... [and] are necessary to protect [the] equal
concern and respect" to which everyone is entitled. 6' According
to Dworkin, for the state to treat people as human beings-as
subjects of equal concern and respect- the state must treat their
disparate life plans and theories of the good as deserving of
162
equal concern and respect.
Similarly, Professor Bruce Ackerman has argued at length
that neutrality is "the organizing principle of liberal thought.' 1 63
For Ackerman, liberalism is not primarily about ideas of natural right or some supposed social contract that explains and
justifies the relationship between the state and the individual.
Instead, liberalism should be understood "as a way of talking
about power." 164 What distinguishes liberalism from other political theories is "the kinds of reasons liberals rely on to legiti156. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 34, at 191.
157. Id. at 192.
158. Id. at 191; see also id. at 222 ("Orthodox liberalism holds that no government
should rely, to justify its use of public funds, on the assumption that some ways of
leading one's life are more worthy than others...
159. Id. at 191.
160. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 34, at 273.
161. DWORKIN, A MATTIER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 34, at 198.
162. See id. at 190-98; see also DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note

34, at 272-78.
163. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 10.

164. Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted).
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mate their claims to scarce resources." 161 For Ackerman, liberalism holds that arguments concerning the exercise of state
power must be neutral with respect to the good. Liberalism definitively rejects claims that require a person to assert "that his
conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of his
fellow citizens" or that "he is intrinsically superior to one or
more of his fellow citizens." 166 With these principles of neutrality in place, reasoned discourse can "demonstrate the illegitimacy of a wide variety of power structures by reducing their
167
proponents to silence."
Likewise, Professor Charles Larmore identifies neutrality as
"the central ideal of the modem liberal state,"1 68 that is, "the
primary ideal of liberalism."1 69 He insists, however, that the
neutrality of the liberal state "is not meant to be one of outcome, but rather one of procedure." 170 According to Larmore,
the state is acting in a neutral fashion if its action "can be justified without appealing to the presumed intrinsic superiority of
1 71
any particular conception of the good life."
This view, which seeks to banish discussion of the good from
legal and political discourse, is at odds with both the Catholic
social tradition and the Church's traditional teaching regarding
the nature of law. 172 According to this teaching, the purpose of
law is to lead human beings to the realization of their genuine
good. Moreover, because man is a personal-and therefore social-being, the genuine good of each person includes the common good of all as an integral component. 173
165. Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted).
166. Id. at 11.
167. Id. at 9.
168. See LARMORE, supra note 2, at 42.

169. Id. at 46.
170. Id. at 44 (emphasis omitted).
171. Id.
172. Many of the premises upon which the Christian understanding of law is
founded are not specifically Christian but rather derive from classical antiquity.
These premises continued to define the dominant view of law in the West until
the Enlightenment. See, e.g., HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW: A STUDY
IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 3-29 (Thomas R. Hanley, O.S.B.,

trans. 1998) (discussing the understanding of law and justice and the relationship
between the two in the thought of ancient Greece and Rome).
173. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, Q. 90, art. 2, Q. 92, art.
1; cf. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 1 54 (noting that "the whole reason for the
existence of civil authorities is the realization of the common good"); Rerum Nova-
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In his contribution to the social tradition, Pope John Paul II
acknowledged and responded to the claim made by some contemporary liberal theorists 74 that law must be neutral with respect to competing theories of the good. According to Pope John
Paul II, the effect of excluding theories of the good from politics
and law is to enshrine ethical relativism. He notes that today
"there is a tendency to claim that agnosticism and skeptical relativism are the philosophy and the basic attitude which correspond to democratic forms of political life." 175 Indeed, some
claim that "such relativism [is] an essential condition of democracy, inasmuch as it alone is held to guarantee tolerance, mutual
respect between people and acceptance of the decisions of the
majority, whereas moral norms considered to be objective and
binding are held to lead to authoritarianism and intolerance." 176
Thus, those who advocate a theory of the good that they contend
is objectively true regardless of its popularity "are considered
unreliable from a democratic point of view, since they do not
accept that truth is determined by the majority, or that it is sub1 77
ject to variation according to different political trends."
As a consequence of the widespread acceptance of this point
of view, Pope John Paul II observed that democracies are experiencing a "crisis within... themselves," which manifests
itself as the inability "to make decisions aimed at the common
good." 178 He warned that the inability to talk about, discern,
and enact laws oriented toward the good is especially destructive of the democratic project. In the absence of truth, and specifically truth about the human person and the good proper to

rum, supra note 19, 9127 (noting that "since it is the end of society to make men
better, the chief good that society can be possessed of is virtue"). This theory of
law also informs the Church's social teaching that a statute or ordinance which is
contrary to the objective moral order is not genuinely law but an act of violence
masquerading as law. See infra notes 436-40 and 446-50 and accompanying text.
174. See Paul E. Sigmund, Catholicism and Liberal Democracy, in CATHOLICISM

supra note 58, at 217, 235 (arguing that "procedural" and "valueneutral" liberal theorists such as Ackerman, Dworkin and Robert Nozick are often
mistakenly lumped together with more "substantive" liberals such as Joseph Raz).
175. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 1 46. For a recent article advancing this
thesis in the context of American constitutional law, see Stephen G. Gey, Is Moral
Relativism a ConstitutionalCommand?, 70 IND. L.J. 331 (1995).
176. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 1 70.
177. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 9146.
178. Id. 9147.
AND LIBERALISM,
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human beings, "the force of power takes over." 179 In democratic
governments, this power takes the form of electoral majorities
and financial resources. Within such a framework, questions
surrounding politics have less to do with the merits of any
given measure than with the electoral tallies of partisan groups
and the funding necessary to acquire them. Under the dynamics of such a system, "each person tends to make full use of the
means at his disposal in order to impose his own interests or
his own opinion, with no regard for the rights of others."8 0 As
such, "everything is negotiable, everything is open to bargaining,"' 81 and "[pleople are then respected only to the extent they
18 2
can be exploited" for one's own ends.
Thus, according to Pope John Paul II, the very reason behind
the liberal exclusion of claims concerning the good-namely, the
preservation of individual rights-in fact works to undermine
those rights. When rights are "no longer firmly founded on the
inviolable dignity of the person," they are instead "made subject
to the will of the stronger part." 183 Of course, the consequences
of this change might not be immediately apparent. The full effects of this fundamental shift might be delayed or hampered
by certain procedural protections, such as the status of rights.
For example, it may be more difficult to change a fundamental
right recognized in a country's constitution or fundamental law
than it would be to overturn rights that are recognized in ordinary legislation. Still, if discussion about the good remains offlimits, exiled from legal and political discourse, a significant
ground for objecting to such a change is no longer available.
a.

The Untenable Nature of Complete Neutrality

In addition to Pope John Paul II's criticism, the claim that the
liberal state must be neutral with respect to competing theories
of the good has been further challenged. Indeed, both critics
and proponents of liberalism have criticized the purported
meaning of "neutrality" and the importance attributed to neutrality in liberal theory.

179. Id. 1 44.
180. Id.
181. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 20.
182. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 1 44.
183. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 9120.
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One of the more salient points raised by these critiques concerns the importance of neutrality itself. It is, after all, hardly
self-evident why neutrality should be the principle that defines
the legal and political order. As Professor Joseph Raz has observed, "[t]he question of the justification of neutral political
concern invites moral and political argument and cannot be
settled by the inherent appeal of neutrality as such." 1 4 Likewise, Professor Robert George has remarked that "the putative
requirement of moral neutrality is neither self-evident nor selfjustifying"; it needs to be vindicated as true "by a valid argument." 8 5 Even Professor Bruce Ackerman, one of neutrality's
leading champions, has conceded that "whatever else it may
be, Neutrality is not a way of transcending value; it is a value,
which can only by defended by locating its relationship to
86
other values."
Plainly, the value that neutrality hopes to serve is not indecision. The litigants in a dispute do not go to court seeking to be
ignored. Rather, the parties want a resolution that each side
hopes will favor his or her particular interests. Likewise, the
proponents of legislation who petition the government want
the state to enact laws that will address their concerns, not remain indifferent to them.1 7 Indeed, as Professor Larry Alexander rightly notes, in choosing between groups who seek to advance interests that are mutually exclusive, "government must
at the end of the day side with one group or the other, at least if
neither of the opposing groups has been convinced of the error
of its beliefs and values." 88 Moreover, siding "with one group
on the matter in dispute is the antithesis of neutrality, at least
from the point of view of the losing group."18 9 As Professor
Steven Smith makes clear, "the state must choose among competing values and beliefs" when formulating a law or deciding
184. RAZ, supra note 115, at 114.
185. Robert P. George, "Same-Sex Marriage" and "Moral Neutrality," in MARRIAGE
AND THE COMMON GOOD 81, 82 (Kenneth D. Whitehead ed., 2001).

186. Bruce Ackerman, Neutralities, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD 29, 29 (R. Bruce
Douglass et al. eds., 1990).
187. See Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REV. 305, 332

(1990) ("Legislatures and courts must make decisions, and decisions require
choices among beliefs and values.").
188. Larry Alexander, Illiberalism All the Way Down: Illiberal Groups and Two Conceptions of Liberalism, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 625, 629 (2002).

189. Id.
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upon a course of action. 190 Because "[s]uch decisions inevitably
require governmental choices among competing conceptions of
the good.., it is implausible to suggest that the government
can make such choices yet somehow remain neutral." 191
Some liberal theorists have acknowledged that neutrality in
law does not mean neutrality with respect to outcome. Charles
Larmore notes that the actions of the state "will generally benefit some people more than others, and so some conceptions of
the good life will fare better than others." 19 2 For Larmore, neutrality means that a political decision "can be justified without
appealing to the presumed intrinsic superiority of any particular conception of the good life." 193 Similarly, Bruce Ackerman
insists that neutrality is not "a way of directly assessing consequences."' 194 Instead, for Ackerman, neutrality must be understood within a "dialogic framework," a "conversational filter"
that prohibits political conversation from "express[ing] a principled public preference 5either between citizens or between
19
their ideals of the good."
In attempting to banish all discussion of the good from the
foundations of law and justice, however, liberal theory attempts to occupy a ground that no one can claim without fear
of contradiction. Thus, some proponents of liberalism, like Professor William Galston, have concluded that "[t]he strategy for
justifying the liberal state that seeks to dispense with all specific conceptions of the good cannot succeed.' 96 Because "[n]o
form of political life can be justified without some view of what
is good for individuals," in practice, liberal theorists always
"covertly employ theories of the good."1 97 That is, despite the
190. Smith, supra note 187, at 314.
191. Id.
192. LARMORE, supra note 2, at 43. The fact that liberal arrangements will inevitably prove to be an advantage to proponents of some conception of the good
over others is reflected in the thought of a number of liberal theorists. See, e.g.,
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 193 (noting that "it is surely impossible for the basic structure of a just constitutional regime not to have important
effects and influences as to which comprehensive doctrines endure and gain adherents over time").
193. LARMORE, supra note 2, at 44.
194. Ackerman, supra note 186, at 39.
195. Id. at 37 (emphasis omitted).
196. GALSTON, supra note 1, at 301.

197. Id. at 79; see also Smith, supra note 187, at 315 (noting that "[tihe necessity of
selecting among competing conceptions of the good can be disguised, but it can-
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overt promises of Dworkin, Ackerman, and Rawls to do without a substantive theory of the good, "[a]ll of them covertly
rely on the same triadic theory of the good, which assumes the
worth of human existence, the worth of human purposiveness
and of the fulfillment of human purposes, and the worth of rationality as the chief constraint on social principles and social
actions." 198 Indeed, "[m]ost accounts of liberalism embrace, tacitly or explicitly, the premise that life is too valuable to jeopardize in conflicts over how to lead it and that conflicts over the
good life must therefore be muted in the name of life."' 99 As Professor Alasdair MacIntyre neatly summarizes, "[t]he starting
points of liberal theorizing are never neutral as between conceptions of the human good; they are always liberal starting
points."230 Laws based upon the liberal values of the "freedom to
express and implement preferences" that are adopted according
to the liberal standards of rational justification cannot help but
"impose a particular conception of the good life, of practical reasoning, and of justice upon those who willingly or unwillingly
20 1
accept the liberal procedures and the liberal terms of debate."
As a result, the kind of neutrality that liberalism purports to
22
embody is never achieved "because it is never possible."
Even the existence of some highly cherished set of rights protected by a government's highest law does not show neutrality
at work. A present-day consensus cannot hide that society still
faces "factious disagreements about which rights it should
value most highly," or that "competing versions of rights inevitably reflect competing conceptions of the good."22 °3 Because
not be avoided"). That liberal theory necessarily includes some theory of the good
leads Galston to conclude that "[wihat is distinctive about liberalism is not the
absence of a substantive conception of the good, but rather a reluctance to move
from this conception to full-blown public coercion of individuals." GALSTON, supra note 1, at 89; see id. at 93 ("Liberalism is the theory not of the neutral state but
of the minimally committed state.").
198. GALSTON, supra note 1, at 92. Galston acknowledges that Larmore is at least
more explicit in noting that his commitment to civil peace is a limitation on neutrality. See id. at 107; LARMORE, supra note 2, at 60.
199. GALSTON, supra note 1, at 107.

200. MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 345.
201. Id. at 344-45. Similarly, Steven Smith concludes that "[t]he whole point of
requiring government to be neutral is to permit individuals to select and pursue

their own values." Smith, supra note 187, at 314.
202. See GALSTON, supra note 1, at 97.

203. Smith, supra note 187, at 315-16.
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"[e]very law is designed to attain some end," every law "embodies a peculiar view of the good." 2°4 Even liberal regimes inevitably make use of some theory of the good in the formulation of law, thus exposing the liberal exclusion of alternative
conceptions of the good as arbitrary and unprincipled. 205
b.

The Common Good as the Norm of Social Life

If liberal neutrality were designed to prohibit making claims
with respect to the good in the formulation of law and public
policy, then Catholic social thought and liberalism would oppose one another on a profound level. From the Church's point
of view, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the common good as a principle of law and public life because the purpose behind civil society 2 6 and the state is the "realization of
the common good." 20 7 Indeed, the common good is "the norm
of social justice." 20 8 Given this importance, there are few themes
that receive as much attention as the common good in the
Church's social tradition. To prohibit any mention of the common good would, as Ackerman suggests, largely reduce the
proponents of Catholic social thought to silence. 20 9
According to the Church's social magisterium, the common
good "embraces the sum total of those conditions of social living, whereby men are enabled more fully and more readily to
achieve their own perfection." 21° It is "not simply the sum total
of particular interests"21 1 produced by a kind of democratic calculus. Rather, "as a result of a tragic obscuring of the collective
conscience," 212 the democratically expressed views of the majority might in fact be contrary to the authentic good of the in-

204. John P. Safranek & Stephen J. Safranek, Licensing Liberty: The Self-Contradictions
of Substantive Due Process, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 231, 245 (1998).
205. See GALSTON, supra note 1, at 93-94; Safranek & Safranek, supra note
204, at 244-45.
206. See Rerum Novarum, supra note 19, 37.
207. Mater et Magistra,supra note 67, 1 20; accord Pacen in Terris, supra note 24, J 54.
208. QuadragesimoAnno, supra note 67, 91110.
209. See ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 9.
210. Mater et Magistra, supra note 67, 165; see also Dignitatis Humanae, supra note
63, 916 (relying on the same passage); Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 9J[ 26, 74 (rely-

ing on the same passage); Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 158 (quoting the same).
211. Centesirnus Annus, supra note 58,

47.

212. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 170.
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dividual and society.2 13 The common good is instead "the good
of all and of each individual" at the same time,214 which is to
say that "it involves an assessment and integration of [particular] interests on the basis of a balanced hierarchy of values." 21 5
Because it is integral in nature, it concerns the good of the
whole person-not just the person's material well-being, but
his or her opportunities for cultural engagement, political involvement, family intimacy, and religious expression. 216 Indeed, the requirement that one assess what is proposed as the
common good against a proper hierarchy of values is meant to
ensure that individuals, families, and society as a whole do not
value "having" over "being." 217 Indeed, because a "man is
more precious for what he is than for what he has," 218 materialism inevitably leads to "radical dissatisfaction." 219
Such an assessment is also necessary because of the changing
demands of the common good. Those aspects of the common
good which relate to the objective moral order of the natural
law do not change, because the nature of the human person
remains the same. Nevertheless, "the concrete demands of [the]
common good are constantly changing as time goes on" 220 because the historical circumstances in which people live are
213. See infra notes 408-14 and accompanying text.
214. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 20, 1 38.
215. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 147.
216. See Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 9129 (stating that "development must
not be understood solely in economic terms but in a way that is fully human," and
referring to religious freedom as the "apex of development"); Gaudium et Spes,
supra note 59, 1 26 (discussing the various aspects of the common good); Octogesima Adveniens, supra note 134, 9 41 (while "quantitative economic growth" is one
measure of progress, we should also look to the "quality and truth of human relations" and "the degree of participation and of responsibility"); id. 146 (in working
to achieve the common good, the state must respect "legitimate liberties" while
acting to create "the conditions required for attaining man's true and complete
good, including his spiritual end"); Populorum Progressio,supra note 64, 9114 (asserting that "[d]evelopment cannot be limited to mere economic growth" but "to
be authentic, it must be complete: integral, that is, it has to promote the good of
every man and of the whole man").
217. Centesimus Annus, supranote 58, T 36; Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 20, 9128;
see also Populorum Progressio,supra note 64, 91 6, 19; Pope John Paul II,Encyclical Letter, Redemptor Hominis 1 16 (Mar. 4, 1979) [hereinafter Redemptor Hominis], availableat
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/encyclicals/documents/hf jpii enc_04031979_redemptor-hominisen.html.
218. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, T 35.
219. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 20, 1 28 (emphasis omitted).
220. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 1 78.
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fluid. 221 Thus, public authorities must be sensitive to these
changes and be prepared to respond to them creatively.
Even so, the basic means whereby the state fosters the common good do not change. The Church's social doctrine teaches
that "the common good is chiefly guaranteed when personal
rights and duties are maintained." 222 It is essential for government to protect and promote "the inviolable rights of man." 223
In fulfilling this responsibility, the state enables each person to
"more easily carry out his duties."' 224 The authentic good of society cannot be realized-indeed, it will always be frustratedif people celebrate their freedoms while neglecting their responsibilities, that is, if people only exercise their rights while
ignoring their duties. Thus, in fostering the common good, the
state must promote and facilitate the fulfillment of duties primarily by "appeal[ing] ... to the conscience of individual citizens" 225 but also, as noted above, by creating conditions that
encourage the performance of duties. 226
The connection the Church draws between rights and duties
again shows the integral nature of the common good. This
good is not properly understood as individual autonomy
bounded only by respect for the rights of others. Rather, the
common good, and indeed the fulfillment of one's dignity as a
227
person, is found in satisfying the duties one has received.
c.

The Nature of the Right and the Priority of the Good

The idea that rights and duties together constitute part of the
common good also serves to correct the misunderstood rela221. Cf. id. 74 (referring to a "dynamically conceived common good").
222. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 60; see also Dignitatis Humanae, supra note
63, 6 (the "common welfare of society... consists chiefly in the protection of the
rights, and in the performance of the duties, of the human person" (footnote omitted)); Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 9 26, 74-75 (the common good involves the
protection and promotion of the rights and duties of the human person).
223. DignitatisHumanae, supra note 63, 6.
224. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 60.
225. Id. 1 48; see also Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 1 74 (stating that the public
authority "must dispose the energies of the whole citizenry toward the common
good, not mechanically or despotically, but primarily as a moral force").
226. See supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
227. See Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 9116 (to obey the law of God written on
the human heart "is the very dignity of man"); Populorum Progressio,supra note 64,
9116 (arguing that human fulfillment constitutes "a summary of our duties" and
the highest goal of this fulfillment is "union with Christ").
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tionship between the right and the good that underlies the
various kinds of liberal neutrality. That is, as Altman makes
clear, liberalism views the normative claims that make up "the
right" as being prior to and independent of the different normative claims that make up "the good." 228
Altman is correct to single out the priority of the right over
the good as one of the central tenets of liberalism and intellectual foundations of liberal neutrality. Although the idea originated in Kant, 229 it is now most closely associated with John
Rawls. In his Theory of Justice, Rawls famously argued that the
liberal ordering of the right as prior to the good stood in contrast
to the various teleological theories, according to which "the
good is defined independently from the right, and then the right
is defined as that which maximizes the good." 23° Because
Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is deontological in nature, it
"does not interpret the right as maximizing the good." 231 Indeed,
for Rawls, "there is no reason to think that just institutions will
maximize the good. ' 232 Moreover, "the concept of right is prior
to that of the good" in that "[tihe principles of right, and so of
justice.., impose restrictions on what are reasonable conceptions of one's good." 233 For Rawls, the idea that the right is prior
to the good means that "something is good only if it fits into
ways of life consistent with the principles of right already on
hand." 234 As Rawls later stated in his book Political Liberalism,
"this priority means that admissible ideas of the good must respect the limits of, and serve a role within, the political concep235
tion of justice."
By contrast, contemporary Catholic social thought, as well as
the historic Western moral tradition prior to the Enlightenment, rejects the lexical priority of the right over the good proposed by Rawls and others. From this historical perspective,
the right and the good are distinct but related. Indeed, the right
228. See supra notes 48-51 accompanying text.
229. See SANDEL, supra note 2, at 10-11.
230. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 24 (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE].

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 396.
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM,

supra note 2, at

176.
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should be seen as a constitutive part of the good. 236 That is, the
reason why the right is desired-the reason why the principles
of justice are inviolable and so earnestly sought in social lifeis because recognition and enforcement of the right itself is
good,237 not because it is somehow independent from the
good. 238 As liberal theorist William Galston has noted, "[i]f we
believe that justice is beneficial, its value stems from the worth
of the benefits it confers on the just agent or on those affected
by that agent's actions. ' 239 Thus, the relationship between the

236. See AQUINAS, supra note 173, at II-II, Q. 58, arts. 3, 5, 6; see also MORTIMER J.
ADLER, SIx GREAT IDEAS 136 (1981) (arguing that justice is in "the domain of the
idea of goodness" and that "[to act rightly or justly is to do good").
237. See Smith, supra note 187, at 316 (arguing that "rights are valuable only insofar as they are related to our conceptions of what is good").
238. Rawls's rhetoric would seem to suggest that the right refers to a moral
quality that is somehow separate, or in Rawls's words, "defined independently"
of the good. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 230, at 24. Indeed, in stressing that "[i]t is essential to keep in mind that in a teleological theory the good is
defined independently from the right," Rawls seems to suggest that the right
could be defined wholly apart from the good. Id. at 25. Likewise, by refusing to
"interpret the right as maximizing the good" and by insisting that "there is no
reason to think that just institutions will maximize the good," Rawls seems to
suggest that the right and the good are not merely distinct but radically different
sorts of values. Id. at 30. Rawls, however, recognizes that the putative priority of
the right over the good cannot be the priority of one independent category of
moral value over another. He concedes that the right is dependent upon a conception of the good. He also admits that to establish the principles of right, "it is necessary to rely on some notion of goodness." Id. at 396. Still, he attempts to minimize the importance of this concession by asserting that only a "thin theory" of
the good, limited to "the bare essentials," is needed to formulate the principles of
justice in the original position. Id. As Charles Taylor has made clear, however, the
principles of justice that Rawls articulates are appealing precisely "because they
fit with our intuitions." CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF
THE MODERN IDENTITY 89 (1989). Rawls makes no attempt to move beyond the
level of intuition. In large part, that is the method and goal of his book-to set
forth a theory of justice that eschews metaphysical commitments. Yet, something
else lies beneath the surface. As Taylor rightly cautions,
If we were to articulate what underlies these intuitions we would start
spelling out a very "thick" theory of the good. To say that we don't "need"
this to develop our theory of justice turns out to be highly misleading. We
don't actually spell it out, but we have to draw on the sense of the good that
we have here in order to decide what are adequate principles of justice.
Id. Thus, from the Catholic point of view, the so-called "priority of the right over
the good" shows itself to be more of a slogan than a serious principle of moral and
political philosophy. It is a rhetorical means of overtly claiming to avoid metaphysical commitments regarding the nature of the good while, in fact, surreptitiously employing those very same sorts of commitments.
239. GALSTON, supra note 1, at 88.
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right and the good is not one of independence, "an unequivocal priority of justice over goodness but, rather, a complex relation of mutual dependence between them." 240 Similarly, as Josef
Pieper has explained, writing from within the Thomist tradition, "[jiustice reaches out beyond the individual subject, because in a certain sense it is itself the bonum alterius, the 'good
of another.'

''24 1

Put another way, neither the right in general nor the possession of specific rights in particular is the end of social life. Hav240. Id.
241. JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES 65 (1966). This traditional understanding of justice is, of course, somewhat at odds with Rawls's account. In
Rawls's theory of justice, persons hidden behind a "veil of ignorance" choose the
principles of justice that will govern their society after the veil is lifted. Behind the
veil, participants have no knowledge of their physical characteristics or other capacities, their social status or wealth, or even their conceptions of the good. See
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 230, at 12. Rawls specifies that the participants behind the veil are "rational and mutually disinterested." Id. at 13. He
makes plain that the concept of rationality that he has in mind is the one "standard in economic theory, of taking the most effective means to given ends." Id. at
14. Accordingly, under the terms of the hypothetical, the participants will choose
the so-called principles of justice because of self-interest. As such, justice is transformed from the traditional concept of "the good of another," set forth above, to
"the good of the self." What had been a virtue that led the self to engage in actions
designed to benefit the other, even at great cost, is now conceived of as the epitome of self-interest.
Furthermore, although Rawls's attempt to exclude self-interest from the deliberative process by which the principles of justice are determined is commendable,
his stipulation that the participants behind the veil of ignorance do not know their
own conceptions of the good renders the entire thought experiment practically
useless. Indeed, because the right is not independent of the good, the participants
behind the veil of ignorance will be unable to choose the principles of justice
without a conception of the good to guide them in their deliberations. The premise upon which Rawls's hypothetical is based is that the participants will act in a
"rational and mutually disinterested" fashion, "not taking an interest in one another's interests" and "taking the most effective means to [advance their] given
ends." Id. at 13-14; see id. at 143 ("A rational person is thought to have a coherent
set of preferences between the options open to him. He ranks these options according to how well they further his purposes; he follows the plan which will
satisfy more of his desires rather than less, and which has the greater chance of
being successfully executed."). But, to act out of rational self-interest, as the hypothetical supposes, one must have a conception of what is in one's self-interest.
That is, one must have a conception of the good. To simply claim that any rational
person, not knowing the conception of the good to which he or she subscribes,
would choose to adopt a maximal guarantee of freedom as one of the basic principles of justice, "the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty
for others," is hardly convincing. Id. at 60. It is by no means clear that the only
rational, or even the most reasonable, choice behind the veil of ignorance would
be for a more capacious freedom.
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ing rights is not an end in itself. The goal is not to possess the
freedom to choose or the mere act of choosing, but the value of
what is chosen. 242 Society values rights, such as free speech and
freedom of religion, "precisely because people regard communication and worship as goods." 243 That is, "freedom is valuable
because it permits us to pursue our good." 244 As Charles Taylor
has said, "the good is always primary to the right" precisely
because "the good is what, in its articulation, gives the point of
245
the rules which define the right."
At the same time, the right is "prior" in the sense that it is the
first obligation within the good. The first duty incumbent on
anyone is to do no harm,246 and claims of right help to ensure
that the state and individuals do not harm others by interfering
with their rights and thereby obstructing their duties. Nevertheless, justice-the good of rendering to another that which is
his or her due-is only the first step. It is the foundation of social life, not its culmination. A society where rights are honored
but duties are neglected will always be incomplete - a social
order marked by a perpetual sense of frustration. Despite the
outward appearance of vitality, such a society is destined to
suffer from a kind of chronic anemia and barrenness. The
promise of freedom will remain unfulfilled where freedom is
understood as a good that is complete in itself, rather than as a
necessary means of attaining some further and greater good.
4.

The Civilization of Love: The Goal of Social Life

Because social and political life is concerned with the good, it
has an end to which it is oriented. In the Catholic social tradition, this end or goal has been variously described as an "authentic human community," 247 the "establishment of universal

242. See GARVEY, supra note 114, at 24 (arguing that the argument that rights are
valuable because they protect the mere act of choosing "explains too much").

243. Smith, supra note 187, at 316.
244. GALSTON, supra note 1, at 86 (citing Charles Taylor, What's Wrong with
Negative Liberty?, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ISAIAH BERLIN
183 (Alan Ryan ed., 1979)).

245. TAYLOR, supra note 238, at 89.
246. Cf. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, It 75 (arguing that the negative precepts
of the moral law lead one to "embrace the entire horizon of the good").

247. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 141.

HeinOnline -- 32 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 558 2009

No. 2]

Neutrality in Catholic Social Thought

brotherhood," 248 an anticipation of the "kingdom of God" 249
and, more recently, the "culture of life."2 Each of these
phrases possesses a certain virtue, but the fullest expression of
the idea that each attempts to communicate-the idea of an integral earthly good-is "the civilization of love." 25' Although
this particular expression owes its origin to Pope Paul VI, 252 the
idea pervades the social tradition. For example, Pope John
XXIII repeatedly insisted that a social order which is "genuinely human" 25 3 must be grounded "in truth," function "according to the norms of justice," and be "inspired and perfected by mutual love."2 Moreover, the Second Vatican
Council itself relied heavily upon this ideal in describing the
255
social order in this three-fold manner.
Love itself is quite obviously the animating principle behind
the "civilization of love," but the Church often speaks in terms
of the principle of "solidarity." 2 6 Although the relationship between solidarity and love is close, it is not a relationship of
complete identity. 2 7 Like love, however, solidarity is "a moral

248. Octogesima Adveniens, supra note 134, [ 17; see also Rerum Novarum, supra note
19, 21 (arguing that "if Christian precepts prevail, the two classes [rich and poor]
will not only be united in the bonds of friendship, but also those of brotherly love").
249. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 20, ' 48.
250. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 991 28, 78-101.
251. Pope John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation, Ecclesia in America 1 10 (Jan. 22,
1999), available at http://www.vatican.va/holyfatherijohn-paul_ii/apost-exhortations/
documents/hfjp-ii exh 22011999_ecclesia-in-americaen.html.
252. GratissimamSane, supra note 21, 9113.
253. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 1 149.
254. Id. 9137; see also id. 9180 (stating that relationships between different nations
"also must be harmonized in truth, in justice, in a working solidarity, in liberty");
id. 91167 (arguing that "peace will be but an empty-sounding word unless it is
founded on the order which this present document has outlined in confident
hope: an order founded on truth, built according to justice, vivified, and integrated by charity, and put into practice in freedom").
255. See Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 9126 ("It must be founded on truth, built
on justice, and animated by love; in freedom it should grow every day toward a
more humane balance.").
256. See Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 9110 ("[W]hat we nowadays call the
principle of solidarity," Pope Leo XII identified by the term "friendship." "Pope
Pius XI used the equally meaningful term social charity," whereas Pope Paul VI
expanded the concept by use of the phrase "civilization of love.").
257. See id. 9149 (referring to a "concrete commitment to solidarity and charity");
Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 20, 9140 (noting that it is "possible to identify
many points of contact between solidarity and charity" but that charity is "the
distinguishing mark of Christ's disciples" where, "[i]n the light of faith, solidarity
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and social attitude" that manifests itself in action. 258 Thus, solidarity "is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress
at the misfortunes" of others. 219 It is instead "a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good;
that is to say to the good of all and of each individual, because
we are all really responsible for all." 260 Plainly, such a commitment to the common good entails a commitment to justice, but
a desire for justice does not exhaust solidarity. Even where justice is "most faithfully observed," "a wide field... remain[s]
open for charity."2 61 Justice can help meet the material needs of
men and women, but because the human person is not simply a
material being, but rather a spiritual being who longs for communion, the operation of "just social structures" will never render "works of charity superfluous." 262 Accordingly, love "will
always prove necessary, even in the most just society." 263 Rendering justice alone, giving each person his or her due, "can remove indeed the cause of social strife, but can never bring about
a union of hearts and minds. ' 264 Indeed, "[i]f, beyond legal rules,
there is really no deeper feeling of respect for and service to others, then even equality before the law can serve as an alibi for
flagrant discrimination, continued exploitation, and actual contempt." 265 Therefore, a society that embraces solidarity is not
content with justice; rather, its members share the "intimate
conviction that they are members of a single family" and so

seeks to go beyond itself, to take on the specifically Christian dimension of total
gratuity, forgiveness and reconciliation" (emphasis omitted)).
258. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 20, I38.
259. Id.
260. Id. (emphasis omitted).
261. QuadragesimoAnno, supra note 67, 137.
262. Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter, Deus Caritas Est 9 28 (Dec. 25, 2005),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/benedict-xvi/encyclicals/documents/
hfben-xvi enc_20051225_deus-caritas-esten.html.
263. Id.
264. QuadragesimoAnno, supra note 67, 137.
265. Octogesima Adveniens, supra note 134, 1 23; see also QuadragesimoAnno, supra
note 67, 137 (noting that, in the absence of charity, "as repeated experience
proves, the wisest regulations come to nothing"). The 1971 Synod of Bishops argued for an even closer connection between justice and love. See Synod of Bishops, Justice in the World [hereinafter Justice in the World], reprinted in CATHOLIC
SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 19, at 288, 293 (arguing that "love of neighbor and
justice cannot be separated" because "love implies an absolute demand for justice" and "[]ustice attains its inner fullness only in love").
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regard the suffering of one as the suffering of all.266 Solidarity
reflects "a commitment to the good of one's neighbor with the
readiness, in the gospel sense, to 'lose oneself' for the sake of
the other instead of exploiting him, and to 'serve him' instead
267
of oppressing him for one's own advantage."
Thus, the "civilization of love" not only requires that an individual's outward conduct conform to the demands of justice as
set forth in law, but also seeks to influence people's interior attitudes and dispositions with respect to one another. The "civilization of love" asks everyone to "work with energy for the establishment of universal brotherhood, the indispensable basis for
authentic justice and the condition for enduring peace." 268
There is, nevertheless, something deeply jarring about the
phrase "the civilization of love." The unease which this expression brings to mind has to do with the relationship between love
and politics. As Pope John Paul II observed, "[eltymologically
the word 'civilization' is derived from 'civis'-'citizen,' and it
emphasizes the civic or political dimension of the life of every
individual." 269 Politics, however, necessarily involves the exercise of power through law. On a basic level, the positive law is
simply that system of rules and other norms which justify the
use of coercive power by the state to ensure the fulfillment of
duties and the free exercise of rights. Hence, as the late Robert
Cover powerfully taught, the application of law often involves
the use of violence: "Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion
the imposition of violence upon others: A judge articulates her
understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his
freedom, his property, his children, even his life." 270
Love is not something that can be coerced or brought about
by violence. Nor is it primarily a matter of emotion, "a simple
transport of instinct and sentiment"; it is "also, and principally,
an act of the free will." 271 Indeed, love is "the free gift of self" 272
266. QuadragesimoAnno, supra note 67, U 137 (citing 1 Corinthians 12:26).
267. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 20, 38 (citing Matthew 10:40-42, 20:25;
Mark 10:42-45; Luke 22:25-27).
268. OctogesimaAdveniens, supra note 134, 17.
269. Gratissimam Sane, supra note 21, J 13.
270. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986). There
are, of course, forms of law which are not coercive in nature. See H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 27-28 (1961) (arguing that some legal rules confer legal powers
upon individuals rather than impose obligations on them backed by threats).
271. Humanae Vitae, supra note 145, 9 (describing marital love).
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whereby the human person acts to bring about the genuine
good of another. 273 The dignity of the human person requires
that acts of love be made "according to a knowing and free
choice," a choice which is "personally motivated and prompted
from within" and not the result of "blind internal impulse" or
"mere external pressure." 274 Accordingly, because the essence
of love concerns the will of the human subject, it cannot be legislated or commanded by any legal authority. By its very nature, love cannot be the immediate object of any juridical act.
Although love is not something the state can compel, it is also
not something that the law should ignore or treat with indifference. Love is so vitally important to each person, so indispensable
in the life of every human being, that any theory of law and politics which does not or cannot account for it should be regarded as
an abject failure. 275 The importance that Catholic social thought
attaches to love does not make love an inescapably religious
value.276 Rather, the true significance of love is an existential and

272. Centesimus Annus, supranote 58, 1 41 (citing Gaudium et Spes, supranote 59, 1 24).
273. See AQUINAS, supra note 173, at II-II, Q. 23, art. 1.
274. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, f 17.
275. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL EsSAY 182 (1988) ("Political theory that fails to address questions of human goodquestions of how human beings, individually and collectively, should live their
lives-is, finally, vacuous and irrelevant.").
276. Some might object that Catholic social thought compounds the violation of
liberal neutrality by suggesting that the state should promote a view of humanity
and the good life that is inherently religious, if not sectarian, in nature. That is,
some might argue that the "civilization of love" is not only a particular theory of
the good, but that it is a specifically Catholic, or at least Christian, view of man
and the purpose and meaning of social life.
On the one hand, the singular importance which the Church attaches to love as a
norm for living may be understood as a matter of religious conviction. Thus, the
Church believes that "only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the mystery of
man take on light." Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, T 22. Apart from Jesus Christ,
"the riddles of sorrow and death" and the bleak reality of human suffering "overwhelm us." Id. In Christ, however, God "fully reveals man to man himself and
makes his supreme calling dear." Id. That calling "consists in the sincere gift of self,"
that is, in living a life of authentic love of God and neighbor. Evangelium Vitae, supra
note 22, 125 (emphasis omitted). Indeed, "[bloth the Old and the New Testaments
explicitly affirm that without love of neighbor, made concrete in keeping the commandments, genuine love for God is not possible." Veritatis Splendor, supra note 95,
14 (emphasis omitted). In particular, Christ's "Passion and Death on the Cross, are
the living revelation of his love for the Father and for others." Id. 120. Moreover,
Christ invites everyone to imitate him in the love of the Cross: "This is my commandment, That you love one another, as I have loved you." John 15:12.
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The Church is charged by her Divine Founder to share this good news with all
humanity. See Matthew 28:19-20 ("Therefore go and make disciples of all nations,
baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit,
teaching them to obey all I have commanded you. And surely I am with you always, until the very end of the age."); see also Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 101
("The revelation of the Gospel of life is given to us as a good to be shared with all
people: so that all men and women may have fellowship with us and with the
Trinity. Our own joy would not be complete if we failed to share this Gospel
with others but kept it only for ourselves." (citing 1 John 1:3)). The Christian duty
to share the faith with all people has been the subject of two major documents by
recent popes. See Pope Paul VI, Apostolic Exhortation, Evangelii Nuntiandi
(Dec. 8, 1975), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 19, at 301, available
at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul-vi/apost-exhortations/documents/
hf.p-vi exh 19751208_evangelii-nuntiandien.html; Pope John Paul II, Encyclical
Letter, Redemptoris Missio (Dec. 7, 1990), available at http://www.vatican.va/
holy-father/john-pauLii/encyclicals/documents/hf-jp-ii-enc(07121990-redemptorismissioen.html. Faithful to this call, the Church proposes "the new command of
love [as] the basic law of human perfection and hence of the world's transformation." Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 1 38; see also Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22,
9[49 ("[T]his is the New Law, 'the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus'[,] ...and
its fundamental expression, following the example of the Lord who gave his life
for his friends[,] ...is the gift of self in love for one's brothers and sisters." (citations omitted) (citing Romans 8:2 and John 15:13)). In this respect "the civilization
of love originates in the revelation of the God who 'is love."' Gratissimam Sane,
supra note 21, 113 (quoting 1 John 4:8, 4:16).
On the other hand, it is possible to understand the great importance attached to
love in Catholic thought not as a matter of revelation, but as the product of philosophical reflection on the human condition. This view does not suggest that we
may "deduce" Christ or the fullness of divine love revealed in the Cross. Indeed,
"[tihe crucified Son of God is the historic event upon which every attempt of the
mind to construct an adequate explanation of the meaning of existence upon
merely human argumentation comes to grief." Fides et Ratio, supra note 134, 1 23.
This does suggest, however, that the evident confusion and unhappiness of the
human person in the absence of love is an observable phenomenon. One need not
rely on theological conviction in order to acknowledge its existence.
In one of the most beautiful and frequently quoted passages in Gaudium et Spes,
the Council fathers wrote that man "cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself." Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 9124. Granted, the Council fathers make this claim while reflecting on the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity, seeing "a certain likeness between the union of the divine Persons, and in the union of
God's sons in truth and charity." Id. Nevertheless, the truth about the triune God
revealed in Jesus Christ, God incarnate, is a truth which "fully reveals man to man
himself and makes his supreme calling dear." Id. '1 22. As such, the mysteries of the
Incarnation and the Trinity help us to understand why love is essential for man's
earthly fulfillment and eternal salvation. The revelation in Christ of God's inner-life
is not, however, necessary in order to observe that love is essential to human happiness. One need not subscribe to any religious doctrine in order to observe, together
with Pope John Paul II, that "[m]an cannot live without love." Redemptor Hominis,
supra note 217, 9110. Immediately following this observation, the Pope points to
Christ as the one who, in the words of the Council, "fully reveals man to man himself." Id. The need for love and the significance of this need pose a question to
which, Pope John Paul U1contends, Christ is the only genuine answer.
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historical fact that society ignores at its peril. As Pope John Paul 1I
powerfully observed at the beginning of his pontificate:
Man cannot live without love. He remains a being that is incomprehensible for himself, his life is senseless, if love is not
revealed to him, if he does not encounter love, if he does not
experience it and make it his own, if he does not participate
277
intimately in it.

If "the subject, and the goal of all social institutions is and must
be the human person," 278 and if "the whole reason for the exis-

tence of civil authorities is the realization of the common
good," 279 then the state must recognize love as a constitutive

part of the human person and the fulfillment of his or her
genuine good. Any adequate theory of law must reckon with
the central importance of love in the history of civilization and
in the life of every human being. The purported value neutral28 0
ity of liberal theory precludes this sort of reckoning.
Even so, the human need for love is not contingent upon the purported truth of
any religious doctrine. One may conclude, purely as a matter of philosophical
reflection, that love is constitutive of the human person and essential for the authentic good and happiness of every human being. Consequently, although a legal
system which promotes the "civilization of love" is not "neutral" as to how it
defines the good, it nevertheless does not impose an inherently religious conception of the good on society.
277. Redemptor Hominis, supra note 217, 9110.
278. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 9125.
279. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 54.
280. To see the difference between the importance attributed to love in Catholic
social thought and in liberal theory, it is helpful to examine Rawls's treatment of
love in A Theory of Justice. This treatment begins with Rawls's critique of utilitarianism, which he faults for "not tak[ing] seriously the distinction between persons." RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 230, at 27. Rawls, however, takes
the remedy for this failing to an extreme. For Rawls, a wide chasm exists between
every person, a separateness not merely reflected in his hypothetical "original
position" behind the "veil of ignorance," but which functions as an ontological
presupposition that informs his entire theory. Indeed, for Rawls, persons are not
merely distinct, but separate, such that the good of another person is ultimately
unknowable. This is because, to Rawls, the good is finally a matter of individual
preference: "[I]ndividuals find their good in different ways, and many things may
be good for one person that would not be good for another." Id. at 448. One person cannot fully assume the preferences, inclinations, and choices of another:
"Even when we take up another's point of view and attempt to estimate what
would be to his advantage, we do so as an advisor, so to speak." Id. Thus, for
Rawls, solidarity and love in the Christian sense are impossible as an epistemic
matter. We cannot know the genuine good of another because that good is not
something that can be known in the abstract, for it is something constructed by
the individual will. Moreover, because Rawls views love as simply seeking the
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Catholic social thought does not suffer from this deficiency.
Indeed, not only does the social tradition account for love, it
champions love as "one of the fundamental principles of the
Christian view of social and political organization." 28 1 It regards
love as "the basic law of human perfection and hence of [the
world's] transformation."282 Moreover, in the "civilization of
love," the law of the state "must help to promote the relationships between individuals and society." 283 The law must do this,
however, while respecting the dignity of the individual and the
nature of love as the free gift of self. That is, in building the "civi24
lization of love," the law must employ noncoercive means. 1

advancement of another person's chosen good, the loves of different people, and
the love of even a single individual, will inevitably clash. Id. at 190-91. Because
love and other "higher-order sentiments do not include principles of right to adjudicate these conflicts," love will look to the principles of justice as fairness "to
determine [love's] aims when the many goods it cherishes are in opposition." Id.
at 191. This has the effect of not only relegating love to a subordinate position to
justice in the political order, as is proper, but also reducing love to a secondary
gloss on competing conceptions of the good -conceptions that are a matter of
indifference for the state. See also MICHAEL J.SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS
OF JUSTICE 168-73 (1982) (discussing the moral epistemology of justice in Rawls
and what this says about love).
To be clear, from the Catholic point of view, any theory (including liberal legal
theory) that regards love as just one choice among many possible choices, none
inherently better or worse than any other, that treats acts of love as being on par
with acts of hatred or selfishness, should be rejected as morbidly deficient. Because liberalism has no theory of the good, because it abstains from judging the
different choices people make, and because it is agnostic with respect to determining what does and does not enhance human flourishing, it cannot account for
love. It cannot distinguish between a life spent loving other people through the
"gift of self" and a life spent indulging one's own appetites in self-love. Cf. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 9136 (distinguishing between a life directed toward
"having" and one directed toward "being").
281. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 9110 (referring to the principle of solidarity).
282. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 1 38.
283. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 20, 33 (referring to "true development").
284. In advocating the use of noncoercive means to promote certain social ends,
Catholic social thought is in agreement with certain liberal theorists. See, e.g.,
GALSTON, supra note 1, at 292-94 (arguing that liberal public principles of the liberal state may have noncoercive effects on the practices of nonliberal communities
within it); RAZ, supra note 115, at 420-24 (arguing that the harm principle must be
in the service of promoting "the conditions of autonomy," but that this allows for
policies that aid in the building of a public culture that supports certain values).
But see Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 385, 398-99 (1996) (noting that in addition to coercive means that raise serious questions about autonomy, the state "also possesses a number of noncoercive
means to promote favored ways of life, such as simple exhortation and the use of
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Accordingly, although love is not something that the law can
compel, it is something that the law should nurture and encourage. The state can help realize the "civilization of love" by intervening "to bring about favorable conditions which will give more
effective help to citizens and groups in their free pursuit of man's
total well-being." 28s The law can help to create circumstances that
enhance love and increase the potential for the genuine expression of love between individuals and among groups.
a.

The Central Importance of the Family

The Church's belief that love must be the virtue that animates society as a whole is not naive idealism, nor is the
Church's vision for society a kind of utopianism. On the contrary, the Church knows that every utopian vision of earthly
paradise-and in reality, every "ideology of progress" 286 -is
doomed to failure. From the Church's perspective, "[t]he appeal
to a utopia is often a convenient excuse for those who wish to
escape from concrete tasks in order to take refuge in an imaginary world." 28 7 Instead, "as an expert in humanity," 288 the
Church views the world through the clear lens of Christian realism-a lens which plainly sees human nature as fallen but open
to redemption-a redemption which cannot be achieved
through the improvement of political structures and scientific
289
techniques, but only "by love."
At the same time, beyond mere platitudes, the Catholic social
tradition offers a number of concrete ways in which this love
can be realized. Specifically, the social tradition teaches that the
most important way in which the state can foster "the condi-

financial and other incentives," but adopting "a presumption against widespread
state action of this sort").
285. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 75; see also supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text (discussing the state's responsibility to create conditions for the fulfillment of those natural duties which correspond to natural rights).
286. Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter, Spe Salvi 9117 (Nov. 30, 2007) [hereinafter
Spe Salvi], available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/benedict-xvi/encyclicals/
documents/hf_ben-xvi enc 20071130_spe-salvien.htnd.
287. Octogesima Adveniens, supra note 134, 37.
288. Pope Paul VI, Address to the Twentieth General Assembly of the United Nations Organization (Oct. 4, 1965), available at http://www.christusrex.org/wwwl/pope/
UN-1965.html.
289. Spe Salvi, supra note 286, 9 25-26.

HeinOnline -- 32 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 566 2009

No. 2]

Neutrality in Catholic Social Thought

tions required for attaining man's true and complete good" 290 is
by devoting its attention and resources to those conditions
which assist the family. Because the family "is the foundation
of society," the "[p]ublic authority should regard it as a sacred
duty to recognize, protect and promote [the] authentic nature
[of marriage and the family], to shield public morality and to
favor the prosperity of home life." 291 Although the family is the
"basic social structure" of man's life 292 and the "natural, primary cell of human society," 293 the family is not simply a convenient structure in which individuals share economic resources and living arrangements. Rather, "[t]he family is a kind
of school of deeper humanity," 294 "a school of love" 295 in which
a person "receives his first formative ideas about truth and
goodness, and learns what it means to love and to be loved,
and thus what it actually means to be a person." 29 6 Understood
in this way, the family should be seen as "the centre and the
297
heart of the civilization of love."
This view of the family, and its essential role in building the
"civilization of love," has enormous implications for law. According to Pope John Paul IL "[a] family policy must be the ba-

290. Octogesima Adveniens, supra note 134, J 46.
291. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 1 52.
292. Populorum Progressio,supra note 64, 1 38.
293. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 1 16.
294. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 9152.
295. Pope John Paul II, Address to the Bishops of Brazil from the East 2 Region on their "Ad Limina" Visit 5 (Nov. 16, 2002), available at http://www.
vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/speeches/2002/november/documents/hfjpii.spe_20021116_brazil-leste-iien.html. The full text that provides this beautiful
phrase is worthy of quotation: "The family, more than any other human reality, is
the place in which the person is loved for himself and in which he learns to live
'the sincere gift of self'. Thus the family is a school of love, as long as it keeps its
own identity: the stable communion of love between a man and a woman,
founded on marriage and open to life."Id.
296. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 1 39. Significantly, the social tradition also
provides that the family educates the human person about the nature and value of
work. See Laborem Exercens, supra note 19, 9110 (describing the family as "simultaneously a community made possible by work and the first school of work, within the
home, for every person"). At the same time, work remains subordinate to family,
67 (arguing that "the entire process of producsee Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 91
tive work ... must be adapted to the needs of the person and to his way of life,
above all to his domestic life"), because "in the first place work is 'for man' and
not man 'for work,"' Laborem Exercens, supra note 19, 16.
297. Gratissimam Sane, supra note 21, ' 13 (emphasis omitted).
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sis and driving force of all social policies." 298 By this, he meant
that the state should promote not only family policies per se, as
they relate to the legal recognition of marriage and divorce, the
care and custody of children, and the laws of inheritance, adoption, and emancipation, but, in addition, the state must also
promote "those social policies... which assist the family by
providing adequate resources and efficient means of support,
both for bringing up children and for looking after the elderly." 299 This understanding of "family policy" includes virtually every body of law imaginable, including, most conspicuously, those areas of law that involve taxation, employment,
education, housing, immigration, and health care. From the
perspective of Catholic social thought, laws that assist the family bolster the "civilization of love" and so work to realize the
300
genuine good of humanity.
From the perspective of liberalism, insofar as the law promotes the so-called "civilization of love," the law violates the
liberal requirement of state neutrality concerning "the good."
As noted above,301 liberal theory holds that the use of coercive
state power should be reserved for the protection and vindication of individual rights, and that it is illegitimate for the state
to endorse a particular conception of the good. Catholic social
thought does not sanction the use of coercive state power to
promote the civilization of love or to violate the rights of individuals. Rather, the state helps to create conditions where people choose to exercise their freedom "in building up [an] active
and lived solidarity." 302 Nevertheless, by encouraging people to
exercise their rights in a certain way, and by seeking to influence how they see their relationship with other people and the
world around them, the state endorses a particular theory
"about the good for man or the good of life." 303 This is squarely

298. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 91
90.
299. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 9149.
300. See Gratissimam Sane, supra note 21, 1 13 (noting that "[t]he phrase [the civilization of love] is linked to the tradition of the 'domestic church' in early Christianity" (emphasis omitted)).
301. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
302. Octogesima Adveniens, supra note 134, 9147.
303. DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 34, at 191. Of course, from the
liberal point of view, governmental action may violate neutrality by favoring a certain theory of the good through noncoercive means, such as offering a benefit on
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at odds with the liberalism championed by theorists such as
Rawls, Dworkin, and Ackerman.2 If the state is to remain neutral with respect to competing theories of the good, plainly it
cannot serve as an advocate for one of those theories, even one
so benignly characterized as the "civilization of love."
b.

The Liberal "Goal" of Social Life: Pluralism and
the Civilization of Tolerance

Because liberal theory does not endorse any specific conception of the good, there is, strictly speaking, no analogue to the
Church's vision of the "civilization of love." Liberalism rejects
"the claim that there is a discoverable excellence or optimal
condition ... which characterizes human beings."3 °5 Thus, there
is no substantive goal of social life that the liberal state should
work to achieve. Indeed, life has no goal or purpose beyond the
particular ends that individuals choose to pursue. Instead, liberalism offers only the goal of a perfected process-an ideal
procedure whereby rights are recognized and carefully protected, and political and adjudicative neutrality is scrupulously
observed. 3 6 This liberal neutrality prevents the state from
"making all sorts of intolerant public pronouncements about
the nature of 'human flourishing. ' 3° Whereas the Church believes that love is "the deepest and most authentic meaning of
life: namely, that of being a gift which is fully realized in the giving
of self,"3 8 the liberal state regards love as a purely "private"
value, one possible choice among many. As Bruce Ackerman
describes it, in liberal society each citizen is "free from any obligation to love his neighbor; he is even free to believe that his
neighbor is a despicable creature who is wasting his own life
and corrupting the lives of those stupid enough to call him

condition of some act or omission involving a constitutionally protected right. See
Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989).
304. But see GALSTON, supra note 1, at 280-89 (supporting the liberal case against
"intrinsic traditionalism" with respect to family policy, but arguing in favor of
"functional traditionalism" on liberal premises).

305. R. Bruce Douglass & Gerald M. Mara, The Search for a Defensible Good:
The Emerging Dilemma of Liberalism, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD, supra note

186, at 257-58.
306. See infra notes 393-451 and accompanying text.
307. Ackerman, supra note 186, at 39 (criticizing Joseph Raz).
308. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 49.
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friend." 3°9 The liberal state "does not pretend to solve the final
mysteries of life," but invites citizens "to make the sense they
310
can of their place in the universe."
The hallmark of such a liberal society will always be pluralism. 311 As such, liberal society must inculcate a virtue beyond
mere respect for individual rights and the rule of law. In any
society where numerous, disparate theories of the good are
adopted and put into action by various individuals, tolerance is
a necessary civic virtue. 312 Thus, in place of the "civilization of
love," liberal theory offers at most a "civilization of tolerance. ' 313 In such a social order, the law plainly recognizes the
right of everyone to "equal concern and respect" 31 4 regardless
of his or her conception of the good. Beyond this, however, it
fosters an attitude of equal concern and respect that must pervade the wider culture.
It is undoubtedly correct to see tolerance as a virtue of social
life and to acknowledge the widespread commitment to tolerance in liberal societies as "a huge achievement that must not
be forgotten or negated." 315 Indeed, during the Second Vatican
309. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 347.

310. Id. at 347-48.
311. See id. at 348 ("Any form of social life that makes sense to any significant
group will find a place in the liberal state.").
312. The suggestion is that tolerance is not merely a political value, but a cultural value that makes liberal politics feasible. Cf. RAWLS, POLMCAL LIBERALISM,
supra note 2, at xxv-xxviii (distinguishing between "political liberalism," which

sets forth principles of justice for a constitutional democratic regime, and various
"comprehensive liberalism[s]," each of which purports to answer basic questions

concerning how one must act in order to live a moral life).
313. GALSTON, supra note 1, at 222 (arguing that the two key features of liberal
society are individualism and diversity and that "[tihe maintenance of social di-

versity requires the virtue of tolerance"); LARMORE, supra note 2, at 51 (acknowledging that, historically, "[1liberalism has always urged toleration for the diversity of ideals and forms of life," but criticizing historic liberalism for failing to
justify the virtue of toleration on neutral grounds).
314. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 34, at 180-83, 272-73 (ar-

guing that the fundamental conception of liberal equality is "[t]he right to equal
concern and respect" by which he means "the right to treatment as an equal" rather

than "the right to equal treatment"); GALSrON, supra note 1, at 182 (describing the
principle of "liberal equality" as the idea that "no social policy can be sustained if its
justification gives unequal weight to the good of different individuals within a society" (emphasis omitted)); LARMORE, supra note 2, at 59-68 (arguing that "equal respect" means that "we cannot treat [others] merely as objects of our will, but owe

them an explanation for those actions of ours that affect them").
315. DAVID HOLLENBACH, S.J., THE COMMON GOOD AND CHRISTIAN ETHics 32 (2002).
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Council, the Church herself expressly endorsed the legal recognition of tolerance with respect to religious belief and practice. 316 Still, it is wrong to overstate the value of tolerance. It is
wrong, as some suggest, to think of tolerance as the highest virtue and crowning achievement of social life.317 Properly understood,318 tolerance is not the pinnacle of cultural and political development, but the necessary starting point for the beginning of
political development and cultural formation. 319 Although tolerance can help ensure respectful dialogue among people who as316. In Dignitatis Humanae, the Council's Declaration on Religious Freedom, the
Church recognized the right to religious freedom with "its foundation in the very
dignity of the human person" as known by "the revealed Word of God and by
reason itself." Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 63, 2. According to the Council
fathers, this right includes the freedom "to be immune from coercion" such that
"no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs," as well as
the freedom not to be "restrained from acting in accordance with his own beliefs,
whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within
due limits." Id.
Clearly this support for the legal right to religious liberty would seem to be consistent with the "rights neutrality" characteristic of liberalism. However, Dignitatis
Humanae supports religious freedom without committing the Church to the kind
of relativism or "epistemological neutrality" suggested by many liberal theorists
with respect to the proper content of religious belief. Indeed, the document makes
plain that all men are "bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially
religious truth," id., and that the "one true religion subsists in the catholic and
apostolic Church." Id. 1. Thus, religious indifference on the part of individuals
and, more subtly, the state, is expressly repudiated. See also Avery Cardinal Dulles, Religious Freedom: Innovation and Development, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 2001, at 35.
Elsewhere, the Council made clear that, although the fullness of religious truth
can only be found in the Catholic faith, other religions "nevertheless often reflect a
ray of that Truth which enlightens all men." Nostra Aetate, supra note 134, 1 2. For
an interesting collection of essays on whether Dignitatis Humanae constitutes a
repudiation of earlier Catholic teaching or a development of doctrine in continuity
with that teaching, see CATHOLIC DOSSIER, Mar.-Apr. 2000 (symposium issue on
DignitatisHumanae).
317. The importance of tolerance is especially prominent in legal literature concerning the First Amendment. See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986); RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY (1992).
318. See A. J. Conyers, Rescuing Tolerance, FIRST THINGS, Aug.-Sept. 2001, at 43
(distinguishing between the "Enlightenment doctrine" of toleration and the premodem Christian practice and habit of mind).
319. See Smith, supra note 187, at 332-33 (arguing that liberal tolerance, unlike
liberal neutrality, "acknowledges that a political community must act on the basis
of substantive values that it regards as true and good" and that although the tolerant liberal society must abide by some orthodoxy, it also acknowledges disagreement and "protects the freedom and autonomy of all its citizens by permitting dissent"); see also PERRY, supra note 275, at 102 ("Liberalism-as-tolerance is an
admirable ideal. Liberalism-as-neutrality is a phantom, a will o' the wisp.").
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sert differing points of view, it cannot serve as the sole, or even
the primary, substantive criterion for resolving disputes when

these viewpoints come into

conflict. 32 0

Indeed, some of the more

astute admirers of tolerance know that "there are major social
and political questions today that call for more vision than tolerance can generate on its own." 321 In short, tolerance is too dim a
light by which to steer the ship of state.
In addition to these shortcomings, Catholic social thought
suggests that a society which does not aspire to anything more
than the "civilization of tolerance" is destined to become a society marked by a profound sense of alienation. In its truest
and most profound sense, alienation occurs when the "essence
of freedom" is understood as "self-love carried to the point of
contempt for God and neighbor, a self-love which leads to an
unbridled affirmation of self-interest and which refuses to be
limited by any demand of justice." 322 The human person "is
alienated if he refuses to transcend himself and to live the experience of self-giving and of the formation of an authentic
human community." 323 Likewise, "[a] society is alienated if its
forms of social organization, production and consumption

320. More precisely, tolerance as a proceduralvalue is indispensable in any society as a way of ensuring peaceful discourse concerning matters of public and private concern. That is, tolerance is a basic ground rule that enables citizens openly
and fairly to discuss, for example, both the legal restrictions on environmental
pollution and the meaning of a new film or novel. By contrast, when tolerance is
offered as a substantive value for the resolution of disputes, it only serves to establish a right to the conduct under challenge. Thus, if tolerance is urged as a principle for resolution of the debate over same-sex marriage, the medicinal use of marijuana, or the combination of auditing and consulting services within the same
accounting firm, then both the practice and the non-practice of the conduct in
question will be tolerated. Taken to its logical extreme, however, tolerance as a
principle of social organization leads to chaos, for example, tolerance of both stopping at red traffic lights and ignoring them. Thus, tolerance cannot be the sole, or
even the primary, principle governing social life. It must be supplemented and
limited by other principles, such as the individual rights of others and the common good. Accordingly, the Church recognizes that even in the case of religious
freedom, tolerance of religious practices may be limited by "the just requirements
of public order." Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 63, 4; see also supra notes 89-93
and accompanying text.
321. HOLLENBACH, supra note 315, at 34. For Hollenbach, these questions include the seemingly intractable problem of minority, urban poverty, and the myriad issues raised by the phenomenon known as "globalization." See id. at 34-61.
322. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, i 17.
323. Id. 1141 (also stating that an "authentic human community" is one that is
"oriented toward [man's] final destiny, which is God").
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make it more difficult to offer this gift of self and to establish
this solidarity between people." 324 As such, a society of alienation, a society that exudes and perpetuates selfishness, "is di32
rectly and radically opposed to the civilization of love."
The polite indifference among the inhabitants of a "civilization of tolerance" is too thin a social bond to overcome the selfishness of men and women "which ultimately harms both [the
individual] and others." 326 In contemporary, liberal society,
man often "indulges in too many of life's comforts and imprisons himself in a kind of splendid isolation." 327 In this context,
the human person experiences "a new loneliness.., not in the
face of a hostile nature which it has taken him centuries to subdue, but in an anonymous crowd which surrounds him and in
which he feels himself a stranger." 328 As such, "[t]he world is
sick," but "[i]ts illness consists less in the unproductive monopolization of resources by a small number of men than in the
lack of brotherhood among individuals and peoples." 329 Beyond mere tolerance and in place of isolation, loneliness, and
selfishness, Catholic social thought proclaims the power of
love. The Church insists that man was not created "for life in
isolation, but for the formation of social unity." 330 Contrary to
the liberal view that social and political life has no goal or purpose other than the maximization of individual freedom, the
Church calls her members to "work to ensure that justice and
solidarity will increase and that a new culture of human life
will be affirmed, for the building of an authentic civilization of
331
truth and love."
B.

A Realist Anthropology

Catholic social thought is also at odds with what Altman
calls "epistemological neutrality." This brand of neutrality is
concerned with what constitutes "acceptable arguments for the
principles that are alleged to demarcate the boundaries of per324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id.
Gratissimam Sane, supra note 21, if 14.
Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 55.
Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 9131.
Octogesima Adveniens, supra note 134, 10.
Populorum Progressio,supra note 64, 1 66.
Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 9132.
Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 1 6.
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missible politics." 332 Altman identifies several competing
strands of this kind of neutrality, including the theory that
rights "must be derived from premises that are noncommittal
on questions of the human good," 333 the theory of reflective

equilibrium, 334 and the theory that rights can be derived from
335
premises widely shared within a given social group.
Altman's own resolution of the matter is rather unsatisfying.
He holds that liberalism should be "indifferen[t] toward the
specific moral epistemology that accompanies the commitment
to individual rights," because "[w]hat counts for liberalism is
the commitment to substantial constraints on politics in the
name of individual autonomy and not the particular epistemology that lies behind that commitment." 336 This has the
ironic sound of what is often disparagingly referred to in liberal circles as "religious faith." That is, what counts for liberalism is the commitment to rights, even if a proper account-that
is, a neutral justification -for such rights cannot be given. Faith
337
makes up for what rational argument cannot attain.
Ackerman's view of liberalism, described above, 338 may be
taken as exemplary of the epistemological neutrality that holds
that the principles for specifying individual rights "must be
derived from premises that are noncommittal on questions of
the human good." 339 Ackerman contends that there are "countless pathways of argument coming from very different directions" that lead to supporting this kind of neutrality. 341 Among
the various justifications offered for epistemological neutrality,
moral skepticism is especially prominent among liberal theorists.341 This sort of skepticism holds that "[w]hile everybody
332. ALTMAN, supra note 17, at 73.

333. Id.
334. See R.AWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 230, at 19-21, 48-51 (describing
the concept of reflective equilibrium).
335. See ALTMAN, supra note 17, at 73-75.
336. Id. at 75.
337. Cf. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE

1850s TO THE 1980s, at 271-76 (1983) (describing legal scholarship's rebirth of conceptualism in Law and Economics, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkinian liberalism as reflecting "the need for some binding faith" and a "new age of faith").
338. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
339. ALTMAN, supra note 17, at 73.
340. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 12.
341. During the first half of the twentieth century, many liberals argued that
skepticism about the objectivity of moral values was a necessary condition for
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has an opinion about the good life, none can be known to be
superior to any other." 342 Although Ackerman purports to be
agnostic about the specific grounds that justify this kind of
neutrality, for him, moral skepticism enjoys a kind of pride of
place. The truth of skepticism is something about which he is
343
hardly skeptical.

maintaining liberal democracy. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 205-10

(1973). Skepticism about the objectivity of any moral values remains a recurrent
theme in contemporary legal theory. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles
and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2-10 (1971) (arguing that courts
should defer to legislative majorities because "[tihere is no way of deciding [matters such as those at issue in Griswold v. Connecticut] other than by reference to
some system of moral or ethical values that has no objective or intrinsic validity of
its own and about which men can and do differ"); Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable
Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1229-30 (arguing that "there cannot be
any normative system ultimately based on anything except human will"). For a
more recent argument regarding liberalism and skepticism, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN CASE FOR CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 9

(2003) (arguing for a legal regime that maximizes human choice based upon a
skepticism that anyone can know "the intensity and preferences of other individuals"). Ronald Dworkin has argued that "[Iliberalism cannot be based on skepticism. Its constitutive morality provides that human beings must be treated as
equals by their government, not because there is no right and wrong in political
morality, but because that is what is right." DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE,

supra note 34, at 203. It is, of course, significant that Dworkin's remarks concern
"political liberalism." Surely it is the case that a government cannot be skeptical
with respect to the normative principles it embodies. This simply underscores the
impossibility of a thoroughgoing neutrality, discussed above. See supra Part II.A.3.a.
Moreover, as an ultimate matter, Dworkin's nonskeptical political liberalism is
founded on a deep-seated skepticism regarding morality. Indeed, Dworkin's
moral skepticism is precisely why he seeks to preclude political discussions as to
whether "one citizen's conception of the good life of one group is nobler or superior to another's." DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 34, at 273; see

Thomas Morawetz, Persons Without History: Liberal Theory and Human Experience,
66 B.U. L. REV. 1013, 1021 (1986) (concluding that "the form of liberalism found in
Rawls and Dworkin is grounded not on political skepticism but on moral skepticism"); see also Joseph Raz, Liberalism, Skepticism, and Democracy, 74 IOWA L. REV.
761 (1989) (criticizing the view that moral skepticism provides an important foundation for liberal freedom). Some have plausibly argued that Rawls's liberalism is
not premised on skepticism, but on agnosticism. See Heidi M. Hurd, The Levitation
of Liberalism, 105 YALE L.J. 795, 796 n.6 (1995) (reviewing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM (1993)); see also RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 63 ("Political liberalism does not question that many political and moral judgments of
certain specified kinds are correct and it views many of them as reasonable.").
342. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 11.
343. See id. at 368 ("The hard truth is this: There is no moral meaning hidden in
the bowels of the universe. All there is is you and I struggling in a world that neither we, nor any other thing, created.").
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Catholic social thought plainly rejects the argument that the
philosophical arguments which underlie the principles of public order must themselves be neutral. The Church often says
that she "has no philosophy of her own nor does she canonize
any one particular philosophy in preference to others." 3 4 Although it is certainly true that the Church does not require adherence to any particular philosophy-not even Thomism-it
is also true that Christianity precludes the acceptance of certain
philosophical presuppositions and conclusions. Thus, it is the
responsibility of the Church's teaching office to "exercise a
critical discernment of opinions and philosophies which contradict Christian doctrine." 34 Ethical skepticism and moral relativism-that is to say, philosophies that hold that there is no
such thing as moral truth or that such truth cannot be known
with certainty by the human mind, or that contradictory modes
of conduct are of equal worth, or that there is no such thing as
human nature or an intelligible good proper to it 346-are not
and cannot be made compatible with the Christian faith and
the intellectual tradition to which it gave rise.
Instead, the Catholic intellectual tradition in general, and the
Church's social tradition in particular, embodies a kind of philosophical realism. Briefly put, realism is a philosophical disposition according to which reality is understood to be mindindependent, such that the things, events, and qualities that
make up the universe enjoy an existence independent of our
experience, description, and cognition of them. Although real347
ism is by no means an exclusively Catholic way of thinking,
it is a defining characteristic of Catholic thought.

344. Fides et Ratio, supra note 134,

49; see also Veritatis Splendor, supra note 95,

1 29 ("Certainly the Church's Magisteriurn does not intend to impose upon the
faithful any particular theological system, still less a philosophical one.").
345. Fides et Ratio, supra note 134, 1 50.
346. See, e.g., Veritatis Splendor, supra note 95, 91932, 46.
347. For example, although not engaging the Catholic intellectual tradition di-

rectly, Professor Michael Moore has been a prolific exponent of the importance of
philosophical realism in legal interpretation and legal theory. See, e.g., Michael S.
Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation,58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985); Michael S.
Moore, Metaphysics, Epistemology and Legal Theory, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 453 (1987) (reviewing RONALD DWORKiN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE (1985)); Michael Moore, Moral
Reality, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 1061; Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 2424 (1992); Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for
The Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871 (1989).
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In the social tradition, this realism is most evident in the
Church's teaching about the nature of the human person. Indeed, if one thing emerges from a review of the Church's social
teaching, it is that one cannot speak intelligently about the
purpose of government and the rule of law without also talking
about the nature of man and the good of the human person.?
Such a discussion necessarily involves truth claims about its
subject. In place of the philosophical skepticism that pervades
so much liberal thought, the Church offers in her social teaching what some have called a "Christian anthropology." 349 This
philosophy of man, which provides "a correct view of the human person," is "the guiding principle ... of all of the church's
social doctrine."350 Moreover, the anthropological claims that
make up this philosophy-that man is made in the image of the
Divine, that every human person is an incarnate being, that he
or she possesses a conscience, free will, and an intellect, and
that all human beings are fundamentally good in nature but
tempted by evil-are not offered as mere conventions that have
only an instrumental value or that purport to represent mere
custom or current consensus. They are instead offered as the
truth about what it means to be a human being. They are the
product of philosophical reflection on human experience in
351
light of the Gospel.
The truth is that behind every kind of jurisprudence lies a
theory of what it means to be a human being. 352 In this respect,
the jurisprudence implicit in Catholic social thought is no different from any other. Indeed, the contention that liberal theory
348. See Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 55 ("For the common good since it is intimately bound up with human nature cannot therefore exist fully and completely
unless the human person is taken into consideration and the essential nature and
realization of the common good be kept in mind.").
349. See John J. Coughlin, O.F.M., Law and Theology: Reflections on What It Means
to Be Human From a FranciscanPerspective, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV 609, 625 (2000).
350. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 11.
351. For useful discussions of the philosophical anthropology that informs the
Church's social magisterium, see Francis Canavan, S.J., The Image of Man in Catholic Thought, in CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND COMMUNITARIANISM, supra note 58,
at 15; Angela C. Carmella, A Catholic View of Law and Justice, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 28, at 255, 260-65.
352. See Coughlin, supra note 349, at 610. For a discussion of the implications of
this assertion with respect to the legality of capital punishment, see Richard W.
Garnett, Christian Witness, Moral Anthropology, and the Death Penalty, 17 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 541 (2003).
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is somehow "neutral" in this regard-that it neither assumes
nor proposes any theory of human nature-is simply fatuous. 35 3 Although the theories of human nature embedded in
liberal accounts of law and justice are certainly less elaborate
and markedly less pronounced, they are, nevertheless, always
present. More importantly, however briefly stated they may be,
these moral anthropologies invariably have a decisive influence
on the larger theories of justice of which they are a part.
Thus, Catholic social thought does not differ from liberal theory in relying upon an understanding of what it means to be a
human being. 354 It does, however, differ in the completeness of
the theory on which it relies and in the candor with which it
proposes this anthropology. Beyond all of the "partial perspec353. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 230, at 13 (stating that one fea-

ture of his theory "is to think of the parties in the initial situation as rational and
mutually disinterested"). For a searing critique of Rawls's assertion that he successfully avoids the use of anything more than a minimal anthropology, see SANDEL, supra note 280, at 172-83. See also Steven Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and
Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103, 1107 (1983) ("Lurking behind [liberal]
neutrality is a conception of what human beings ought to be like and how they
ought to think."). At times, the conceit necessary to assert that a theory of justice
can be fashioned without recourse to a theory of human nature is nothing short of
astounding. See, e.g., LARMORE, supra note 2, at 25 (insisting that, contrary to Alasdair MacIntyre and other critics, "by its very nature liberalism must be a philosophy of politics, and not a philosophy of man"). It is simply ludicrous to suggest
that one can articulate a theory of justice without saying something substantial
about the nature of the being who receives justice and the being who dispenses it,
the being who desires justice and the one who impedes its progress. The attempt
to eschew a philosophical anthropology-to articulate a theory of justice that is, as
Rawls says, "political, not metaphysical" -is doomed to failure. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 223 (1985). As
William Galston says, paraphrasing Amy Gutmann, "it is one thing to say that
liberalism does not presuppose a single metaphysical view of the individual, but
quite another to say that liberalism is compatible with all such views." GALSTON,
supra note 1, at 152. The theory of human nature upon which a theory relies may
not be spelled out, but it will always be present, see TAYLOR, supra note 238, at 89,
and it will always preclude certain alternatives.
354. To their credit, some liberal theorists acknowledge that a political theory will
necessarily contain within it some theory of man because "conceptions of freedom
directly derive from views of what constitutes a self, a person, a man." ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY 181 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002). The judgment to restrict certain actions
in turn depends on how we determine good and evil, that is to say, on
our moral, religious, intellectual, economic and aesthetic values; which
are, in their turn, bound up with our conception of man, and of the basic
demands of his nature. In other words, our solution of such problems is
based on our vision, by which we are consciously or unconsciously
guided, of what constitutes a fulfilled human life ....
Id. at 214-15.
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tives" offered by individual philosophies and the physical and
social sciences, the Church offers "an integral vision of man
and of his vocation." 355 Many aspects of this anthropology are
relevant to law, but two are of special importance.
1.

The Human Person: Freedom and Intellect

According to Catholic social teaching, man "is a person, that
is to say, a subjective being... capable of deciding about himself and with a tendency to self-realization." 356 As a person,
357
"his nature is endowed with intelligence and free will."
These two qualities -rationality and freedom-largely define
the human person and set him apart from the rest of creation.
As Pope Leo XIII made clear at the beginning of the modem
social tradition, "[i]t is the mind, or the reason, which is the
chief thing... which makes a human being human, and distin358
guishes him essentially and completely from the brute."
Freedom also sets man apart from other creatures. Through
the exercise of his free will, man is "the master of his own actsgovem[ing] himself by the foresight of his counsel." 359 Indeed,
"man's dignity demands that he act according to a knowing and
free choice." 360 Thus, in her anthropology, the Church recognizes
that the integral good of the individual cannot be realized with-

355. Humanae Vitae, supra note 145, 7; see also Octogesima Adveniens, supra note
134, 40 (noting that "each individual scientific discipline will be able, in its own

particular sphere, to grasp only a partial-yet true-aspect of man; the complete
picture and the full meaning will escape it").

356. Laborem Exercens, supra note 19, [ 6. John Noonan notes that the greatest debt
that law owes "to theology is the idea of the person-a concept that can be philosophically defended, but which historically developed under theological auspices,

with human beings understood by analogy to the divine persons" of the Holy Trinity. John T. Noonan, Jr., A Catholic Law School, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037, 1042

(1992). For useful historical discussions of this conceptual development in Christian
theology, see LEO DONALD DAVIS, S.J., THE FIRST SEVEN ECUMENICAL COUNCILS
(325-787): THEIR HISTORY AND THEOLOGY (1987); GERALD O'COLLINS, S.J., CHRISTOLOGY: A BIBLICAL, HISTORICAL, AND SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF JESUS CHRIST (1995).

357. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 1 9.
358. Rerum Novarum, supra note 19, 5; see also Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59,
15 ("Man judges rightly that by his intellect he surpasses the material universe,
for he shares in the light of the divine mind.").
359. Rerum Novarum, supra note 19, 9 6.
360. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 9 17.
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out reference to that individual's freedom. 361 Indeed, "[o]nly in
362
freedom can man direct himself toward goodness."
At the same time, however, human freedom is not a matter
of unrestricted choice. 363 Freedom is not the capacity to render
"categorical and infallible decisions about good and evil." 364 It
is not the power to "create values." 365 If this were the case, then
freedom "would enjoy a primacy over truth, to the point that
366
truth itself would be considered a creation of freedom."
Taken to its logical conclusion, such a radical notion of freedom
would mean that "man would not even have a nature; he
would be his own personal life-project" composed of "nothing
367
more than his own freedom!"
Far from being unrestricted, "the manner in which the individual exercises his freedom is conditioned in innumerable
ways. '' 368 The physical body that every human being possesses,
with all its limitations, demonstrates the restricted nature of
human choice. The human body is constituted in a certain way
such that there are goods proper to it-goods that are not chosen, but are simply given. Still, although the physical and temporal conditions of human life can and do influence the exercise of freedom by making it more or less difficult, "they cannot
destroy it."369 Regardless of the influences affecting him or her,
every human being remains "the principal agent of his [or her]
370
own success or failure."
In Catholic social thought, freedom is not simply the absence
of impediment, what Isaiah Berlin famously termed "negative
freedom." Properly understood, freedom has a "positive" di361. Cf. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 9113 (criticizing Socialism for ignoring
this fact).
362. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 1 17.
363. See Octogesima Adveniens, supra note 134, 1 35 (noting that "at the very root
of philosophical liberalism is an erroneous affirmation of the autonomy of the
individual in his activity, his motivation, and the exercise of his liberty").
364. Veritatis Splendor, supra note 95, 9132.
365. Id. 9 35.
366. Id.
367. Id. 9146.
368. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 1 25.
369. Id.
370. Populorum Progressio,supra note 64, 1 15. By "success or failure" Pope Paul
VI referred to moral, rather than material, success or failure. Indeed, as the rest of
the paragraph makes clear, because he possesses freedom and intelligence, man is
"responsible for his fulfillment as he is for his salvation." Id.

HeinOnline -- 32 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 580 2009

No. 2]

Neutrality in Catholic Social Thought

mension as well.3 71 More precisely, freedom has an "essential
and constitutive relationship to truth." 372 Freedom "possesses
an inherently relational dimension"37 3 in that through freedom,
every individual is capable of relating to the truth concerning
the authentic moral good of the human person. As such, authentic freedom "is never freedom 'from' the truth but always
and only freedom 'in' the truth."374 Genuine freedom means
being "open[] ... to that which allows men and women to
come to complete self-understanding." 375 Accordingly, truth is
376
not a limitation on freedom, but its "first condition."
Put another way, because goodness is a real quality and not
simply a name attached to things that particular individuals
find appealing, freedom is not "a license for doing whatever
[one] pleases.., even if it is evil." 377 Authentic freedom is not
simply an open-ended possibility, a boundless horizon of
choice. Freedom does not make man "an end unto himself,"3 7
nor is it simply "a claim for autonomy [which] oppos[es] the
371. The basic distinction between "negative" and "positive" freedom was famously set forth by Isaiah Berlin in his essay "Two Concepts of Liberty." See BERLIN, supra note 354, at 168-81. For a thoughtful critique of Berlin, see George
Weigel, A Better Concept of Freedom, FIRST THINGS, Mar. 2002, at 14.

372. Veritatis Splendor, supra note 95, 914.
373. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 1 19.
374. Veritatis Splendor, supra note 95, 9164.
375. Fides et Ratio, supra note 134, 9113.
376. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 9 41.
377. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 1 17. Here liberal theory and Catholic social
thought differ. Whereas some versions of liberalism overtly support a legal "right
to do wrong," see WALDRON, supra note 34, at 65 (arguing that "Ulust as individuals may have legal duties that require them to perform wrong acts.., so they may
have legal rights that entitle them to perform actions that are wrong from the
moral point of view"), the endorsement of rights found in Catholic social thought,
discussed above, does not. See supra Part II.A.1. Indeed, Catholic social thought
makes plain that an action that is inherently wrong cannot be protected in law as
a "right." See, e.g., Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 1 71 (arguing that the state "can
never presume to legitimize as a right of individuals... an offence against other
persons caused by the disregard of so fundamental a right as the right to life"). At
the same time, the social tradition recognizes that the law may refrain from prohibiting some practices for prudential reasons. See, e.g., Quaestio de abortu, supra
note 86, 91[ 20-21 (arguing that the civil law "must often tolerate what is in fact a
lesser evil, in order to avoid a greater one" such that while "[h]uman law can abstain from punishment... it cannot declare to be a right what would be opposed
to the natural law"). Thus, the positive law might refrain from prohibiting some
form of conduct, such as homosexual acts or the use of artificial contraception,
which the Church regards as intrinsically wrong.
378. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 9120.
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freedom of others."3 79 Indeed, "freedom attains its full development only by accepting the truth" 38 -the truth about the
nature of the human person-which "mak[es] it possible for a
person to order his needs and desires and to choose the means
381
of satisfying them according to a correct scale of values."
Thus, freedom is the means whereby the human person pursues the good, of which justice is a constituent part, assimilates
it, and makes it his or her own.
2.

Love: The Fulfillment of Human Freedom

Paradoxically, the Church believes that the consummation of
freedom is not the power of acquisition, but the power of gift.
The Gospel shows "that freedom is acquired in love, that is, in
the gift of self." 382 Specifically, the Church believes that "[t]he
Crucified Christ reveals the authentic meaning of freedom; he
lives it fully in the total gift of himself and calls his disciples to
share in his freedom."3 3
At the same time, the centrality of love in the constitution of
the human person is a reality that reason and experience make
known without the specific aid of revelation. 384 As John Garvey
observes, love "is an essential part of a good life" such that
"[olne who lived without loving and being loved would be less
than human." 38 5 Moreover, love is not valued instrumentally. It
is not valued "because it gives me a pleasant feeling" as "it
sometimes happens that love results in my feeling miserable,
but I wouldn't give up my love for a better feeling." 386 Instead,
the disposition to love and be loved is simply part of the nature
of the human person.
Because "the full meaning of freedom" is "the gift of self in
service to God and one's brethren," 387 freedom is "ultimately
directed towards communion." 388 Put another way, man, "by
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

Octogesima Adveniens, supra note 134, 47.
Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 9146.
Id. 9 41.
Veritatis Splendor, supra note 95, 9 87 (emphasis omitted).
Id. 9185 (emphasis omitted).
See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
GARVEY, supra note 114, at 28.

386. Id. at 28-29.
387. Veritatis Splendor, supra note 95,
388. Id. 186.

9187

(emphasis omitted).
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his innermost nature.. . is a social being, and unless he relates
himself to others he can neither live nor develop his potential." 3 9 The call to communion, which is innate to every human
person and "not something added on to [him]," 390 is a call that
can be fulfilled only in love. Although justice is a necessary
condition for a properly ordered social life, "[l]ove is ...the
391
fundamental and innate vocation of every human being."
Without love, every person remains a mystery to himself or
herself. Indeed, the human person "cannot fully find himself
except through a sincere gift of himself." 39 2 Thus, material circumstances can influence the exercise of freedom, but freedom
is not ultimately the mere absence of impediment. Authentic
freedom is not so much freedom from constraints as it is freedom for something or, more correctly, someone. From the perspective of Catholic social thought, the liberal notion of the unencumbered individual-the radically autonomous self who is
separated from all others except as he or she consents to some
limited connection- cannot serve as either the predicate or the
goal of a correct understanding of law and politics.
C.

Neutrality and the PoliticalProcess

With respect to what Altman calls "political neutrality" 393 in
liberal theory, the Church's social teaching is somewhat sympathetic. According to Altman, political neutrality demands
that the various institutions that make up government be designed to ensure a wide diffusion of political power. 394 Because
such an arrangement makes it difficult for any particular group
to dominate the political scene and enact its views into law, political neutrality encourages a civic dynamic of negotiation,
"normative compromise and accommodation." 395
Here it is worth noting that many of the features of the
American political system appear to satisfy the demands of political neutrality. Some of the more significant examples that
readily come to mind include the existence of a written consti389. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 9 12.
390. Id. 125.
391. FamiliarisConsortio,supra note 21, 9T11.
392. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, T 24.
393. ALTMAN, supra note 17,at 76.
394. Id.
395. Id.

HeinOnline -- 32 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 583 2009

584

HarvardJournalof Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 32

tution that sets forth the limited powers of government and the
enumerated rights of individuals; the separation of powers
among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government; the system of checks and balances among the three
branches of the federal government, and between the federal
government and the several States; the proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on state population and the equal representation of each state in the Senate; the
regular accountability of public officials through direct elections; the widely available, though underutilized, right to vote;
396
and the right to free expression and freedom of the press.
It is also worth observing that, in endorsing democratic government and separation of powers, liberalism expresses a decidedly non-neutral preference in favor of certain governmental
structures, ostensibly for the sake of neutrality. Every set of procedures, whether it governs the adjudication of cases in court, the
election of officials to office, or the adoption of legislation, embod397
ies certain values, indeed, a particular conception of the good.
In contrast to liberalism's forthright endorsement of democratic government, the Church's traditional stance was one of
indifference to the particular form of government adopted by a
given people, so long as their institutions conformed "to right
reason and natural law." 398 Historically, the thinking of the
Church was that the choice of a particular form of government
should depend on the "circumstances which will vary in different times and in different places." 399 Indeed, the Second
Vatican Council expressly taught that "the choice of government and the method of selecting leaders are left to the free
will of citizens." 40 This indifference frees the Church; she is not
396. See generally U.S. CONST.

397. See supra Part II.A.3.a.
398. Rerum Novarum, supra note 19, 1 25; see also ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF
GOD bk. V, ch. 17, at 166 (Marcus Dods trans., The Modem Library 2000) (asking
"what does it matter under whose government a dying man lives, if they who
govern do not force him to impiety and iniquity?"); cf. Gaudium et Spes, supra note
59, ff 42 (stating that the church may work freely "under any kind of government

which grants recognition to the basic rights of person and family and to the demands of the common good").
399. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 1 68; see also Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59,
74 ("The practical ways in which the political community structures itself and
regulates public authority can vary according to the particular character of a people and its historical development.").
400. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 1 74.
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bound "to any political, economic, or social system" 401 and can
carry out her mission around the world among diverse peoples
governed by a variety of political structures.
1.

Positive Supportfor Democratic Government

As noted above, the Church was initially hostile to the establishment of democratic governments and the revolutionary
movements that inspired them.4°2 With the advent of modern
Catholic social thought, however, the Church began to give
strong support to political democracy and democratic institutions. Nevertheless, the reasons given in Catholic social
thought for doing so differ markedly from those advanced under the liberal idea of political neutrality.
Under the idea of political neutrality advanced by Altman,
the principal reason given in support of democracy is essentially negative. 403 On this account, the primary motivation behind the establishment of democratic government is fear:4°4 the
fear of cruelty and the fear of arbitrary authority. This fear can
also include the fear of domination by a political faction, such
as that articulated by James Madison in Federalist No. 10.4o The
direct and regular election of officials by the people, the principle of separation of powers, and the system of checks and balances, including those procedures that require accommodation
and compromise to cull together legislative majorities, all help
to allay the fear that a single group or fixed majority will
dominate the political scene and, thereby, seek its own advantage or impose its view of the good on society at large. From
this vantage point, the good of democratic government is the
evil that it prevents.
In contrast to this view, the Church's support for democracy is
essentially positive. Plainly, Catholic social doctrine, like liberal
theory, is also concerned that the instruments of government
should not be used "to serv[e] the advantage of a certain faction

401. Id.

42.

402. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
403. See ALTMAN, supra note 17, at 76.
404. See Judith N. Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL
LIFE 22, 22 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989).
405. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 42 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001); see also ALTMAN, supra note 17, at 76.
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or of the rulers themselves." 40 6 Indeed, the Church "cannot encourage the formation of narrow ruling groups which usurp
the power of the state for individual interests or for ideological
ends." 40 7 But these concerns are present regardless of the specific form of government the state adopts.
Instead of basing its support for democracy on the evils
that popular government seeks to avoid, Catholic social
teaching stresses the positive value of participation in civic
affairs. Building on the teaching of Popes Pius XII and John
XXIII, 40 8 the Second Vatican Council declared that governments "should ...afford all their citizens the chance to participate freely and actively in establishing the constitutional bases
of a political community, governing the state, determining the
scope and purpose of various institutions, and choosing leaders. '' 409 Indeed, elsewhere the Council praises "those national
procedures which allow the largest possible number of citizens
to participate in public affairs with genuine freedom." 410 The
Church judges such democratic participation in political life to
be a good thing, one of the "signs of the times" 411 in that it reflects "a keener awareness of human dignity" 41 2 and a sense of
406. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 1 73; see also Pacem in Terris, supra note 24,
156 (stating that civil authority must promote the common good "without preference for any single citizen or civic group"); Quadragesimo Anno, supra note 67,
T 109 (lamenting that "[tihe State which should be the supreme arbiter, ruling in
queenly fashion far above all party contention, intent only upon justice and the
common good, has become instead a slave, bound over to the service of human
passion and greed").
407. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 9 46.
408. The works of Pope John XXIII on which the Council relied include Mater et
Magistra, supra note 67, and Pacem in Terris, supra note 24. The works of Pope Pius
XII upon which the Council relied include Pope Pius XII, Christmas Message,
True and False Democracy (Dec. 25, 1944), reprinted in 2 THE MAJOR ADDRESSES OF

POPE PiuS XII, at 78 (Vincent A. Yzermans ed., 1961), available at http://www.
papalencyclicals.net/Piusl2/pl2xmas.htm, and Pope Pius XII, Christmas Message,
The Internal Order of States and People (Dec. 25, 1942), reprinted in 2 THE MAJOR ADDRESSES OF POPE PuS XII, supra, at 51, available at http://www.papalencyclicals.net/
Pius12/P12CH42.HTM.
409. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 9175.
410. Id. 1 31.
411. Id. 1 4; see also Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 91
70 (stating that the "almost
universal consensus with regard to the value of democracy... is to be considered
a positive 'sign of the times"').
412. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 73. Pope John XXIII was even clearer on
this point. See Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 179 (noting that "the men of our time
are becoming increasingly conscious of their dignity as human persons" and that
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responsibility for the needs of others. 413 Thus, the Council concluded that all citizens should "be mindful of their simultaneous
right and duty to vote freely in the interest of advancing the
common good."

4 14

With respect to the various institutions that make up government, the Church has, since the publication of Pacem in Terris, explicitly recommended the threefold division of government into legislative, executive, and judicial branches. 415 Until
recently, this recommendation was not based on the concerns
regarding the distribution and limitation of power that underlie Altman's concept of political neutrality. In Centesimus Annus, however, Pope John Paul II argued in favor of tripartite
government because "it is preferable that each power be balanced by other powers and by other spheres of responsibility
416
which keep it within proper bounds."
The assertion that the division of public authority into three
branches checks the exercise of power by any one of them may be
valid, but it was not the original justification given in the Church's
social magisterium. Instead, function and competence justified
tripartite government. For example, Pope John XXIII argued that
such a threefold division would help civil authorities "most effectively fulfill their respective functions. ' 417 The difficulty involved
in judging the validity and application of one's own work, rather
than a concern with the aggregation of power in any one person's
hands, seems to lie behind this recommendation. Thus, Pope John
XXIII concluded "that it is in keeping with the innate demands of
human nature that the state should take a form which embodies
"[tihis awareness prompts them to claim a share in the public administration of
their country, while it also accounts for the demand that their own inalienable and
inviolable rights be protected by law").
413. See Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 9191
30-31.
414. Id. 75. Pope John XXIII further suggested that democratic participation
will assist public officials in that their "frequent contact with the citizens" will
make it "easier for them to learn what is really needed for the common good."
Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 1 74.
415. See Pacem in Terris, supra note 24,

91 67-68;

see also MICHAEL J. SCHUCK,

1740-1989,
at 164 n.61 (1991) (stating that this passage "constitutes the first recognition of the
principle of separation of powers in encyclical literature"). But see Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 9144 (attributing the first papal endorsement of tripartite government to Pope Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum).
416. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 9 44.
417. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 1 67.
THAT THEY BE ONE: THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS

HeinOnline -- 32 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 587 2009

HarvardJournalof Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 32

the threefold division of powers corresponding to the three principal functions of public authority." 418 Support for separation of
powers based on fear of political domination, as located in liberal
theory, does not preclude support based on competence. Although the two rationales may be mutually reinforcing, each
represents a distinct emphasis.
2.

Human Dignity as a Limit to Democratic Legitimacy

Although the Church's support for democratic government
is strong, it is not absolute. As Pope John Paul II warned,
"[d]emocracy cannot be idolized to the point of making it a
substitute for morality or a panacea for immorality." 419 Surely
"[t]he church values the democratic system inasmuch as it ensures the participation of citizens in making political choices,
guarantees to the governed the possibility both of electing and
holding accountable those who govern them, and of replacing
them through peaceful means when appropriate." 420 Nevertheless, ultimately "the value of democracy stands or falls with the
421
values which it embodies and promotes."
This qualified endorsement of democratic government is
consonant with the Catholic understanding of the purpose behind the state, whatever its particular form. This purpose is a
substantive end, whereas "[f]undamentally, democracy is a
'system' and as such is a means and not an end." 422 Pope John
XXIII succinctly taught that, "the whole reason for the existence
of civil authorities is the realization of the common good." 423 As
discussed at length above, this common good consists of protecting the rights and fostering the duties of the human person

418. Id. 1 68; see also id. 1 76 (arguing that each state should have a written constitution "which prescribes the manner of designating the public officials along
with their mutual relations, the spheres of their competence, the forms and systems they are obliged to follow in the performance of their office").
419. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 9170.
420. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 9 46.
421. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 9170.
422. Id.
423. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 9154; see also Octogesima Adveniens, supra note
134, 146 ("Political power ... must have as its aim the achievement of the common good."); Rerum Novarum, supra note 19, 9128 (noting that "government's
whole reason of existence" is to "safeguard the community and all its parts").
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while creating those other conditions that contribute to his or
her integral fulfillment. 424
A system of government based on democratic procedures
may succeed in limiting the possibility of dominant faction. If it
cripples the public authority, however, making it unable to
take steps to advance the common good, then it is a disservice
to the people. Because the state "is more than the mere guardian of law and order," it must strive to realize both "public
well-being and private prosperity." 425 Moreover, if democratic
procedures result in the denial of inviolable rights of the human person, then the state erases the justification for its own
existence. No majority, even if pieced together through the otherwise laudable process of compromise and negotiation, "may
violate these rights." 426 Indeed, the Church expressly rejects the
argument that the genesis of fundamental rights is recognition
by the democratic majority, that "the original and single source
of civic rights and duties [can be found] ...in the mere will of
427
human beings, individually or collectively."
On this point Catholic social thought and liberal theory both
agree and disagree. They agree that, as Altman explains, "po428
litical neutrality is strictly subordinate to rights neutrality."
Whatever compromises and negotiations take place within the
democratic process, they "must operate within the borders set
by substantial constraints on politics that are imposed in order
to protect and promote individual autonomy. ' 429 As set forth at
length above, however, liberal theory and Catholic social
thought disagree as to the epistemological foundation of such
rights, the existence of duties beyond respect for other people's
rights, and the relationship between the right and the good.43

424. See supra Part II.A.3.b.
425. Quadragesimo Anno, supra note 67, 9 25 (quoting Rerum Novarum, supra

note 19,

26).

426. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 44.
427. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 1 78.
428. ALTMAN, supra note 17, at 76.

429. Id.
430. See supra Parts II.A.2-3, I.B.
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Neutrality in Adjudication

Under the variety of neutrality that Altman calls "legal neutrality, ' 431 a judge or other decision maker in an adjudicative
setting may not reassess the value choices that other public authorities have made in the creation of the law. This kind of neutrality envisions a fairly strict separation between politics and
law, that is, between the normative judgments and compromises that take place in the process of formulating and adopting statutes and regulations and the distinct types of judgments
that take place in interpreting and applying these texts in disputes between litigants. Although Altman acknowledges that it
is "impossible to insulate the legal process completely from assessments of the normative views that competed in the political
arena," he contends that liberalism requires legal reasoning to
"proceed, for the most part, without reliance on political judg432
ments about the views that compete in the legislative arena."
Given the earlier discussion concerning the principle of the
separation of powers, it is easy to construe this idea of legal neutrality as being consistent with Catholic social thought. The division of public authority into three separate branches can help to
preserve adjudication as a distinctly legal function, a function
that takes shape not only through its own institutions and structures, but one that possesses its own discipline, culture, and way
of thinking. Indeed, the Second Vatican Council taught that the
state must establish "a positive system of law," which involves
"a division of governmental roles and institutions," including
"an effective and independent system for the protection of
rights." 433 Pope John Paul II went even further, suggesting that
distinguishing the different functions of government is essential
to the rule of law. That is, if the judiciary were to exercise simple
political choice in applying the law in a given case, then citizens
would not enjoy the rule of law. The norms that govern society
would, in that case, not be truly sovereign. Instead, they would
434
reflect only "the arbitrary will of individuals."

431. ALTMAN, supra note 17, at 76-77. One might also call it "adjudicative neutrality." See supra note 47.

432. Id. at 77.
433. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59, 75.
434. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 144.
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The Problem of Enforcing Unjust Laws

Clearly, support for what Altman calls "legal neutrality" can
be found in the Church's social magisterium. 435 Nevertheless,
Catholic social thought qualifies this kind of neutrality in a significant way. The Church has long taught that an unjust law is
not "law." 436 According to this view, "if civil authorities pass
laws or command anything opposed to the moral order and
consequently contrary to the will of God, neither the laws
made nor the authorizations granted can be binding on the
consciences of the citizens." 437 Although such governmental
norms may appear to be law, they are "only the tragic caricature of legality" 438 and are "completely lacking in authentic juridical validity." 439 Thus, for example, in Evangelium Vitae, with
specific reference to laws that authorize abortion and euthanasia, Pope John Paul II concluded that "a law which violates an
innocent person's natural right to life is unjust and, as such, is
440
not valid as a law."
This aspect of Catholic social doctrine presents the question:
Can a judge abide by the demands of liberal legal neutrality
and not reassess and reweigh the contending normative views
behind a law yet simultaneously refuse to recognize the judicial
validity of a law that he or she concludes is inherently unjust?
In other words, are legal neutrality and Catholic teaching on
the invalidity of unjust laws compatible?

435. See supra notes 416-18 and accompanying text.
436. See AQUINAS, supra note 173, at I-I, Q. 92, art. 1, Q. 93, art. 3, Q. 95, art. 2, Q.
96, art. 4; ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 398, at bk. IV, ch. 4, at 88 ("In the absence of
justice, what is sovereignty but organized brigandage?"). But see FINNIS, supra
note 58, at 363-66 (arguing that the tradition does not deny the validity of
iniquitous rules).
437. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 1 51; see also Dignitatis Humanae, supra note
63, 7 (noting that government action must "be controlled by juridical norms
which are in conformity with the objective moral order"); Gaudium et Spes, supra
note 59, 1 74 (stating that "political authority... must always be exercised within
the limits of morality and on behalf of the dynamically conceived common good,
according to a juridical order enjoying legal status" and that when these conditions are satisfied, "citizens are conscience-bound to obey").
438. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 1 20.
439. Id. 9172; see also Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 1 61 ("[I]f any government
does not acknowledge the rights of man or violates them, it not only fails in its
duty, but its orders completely lack juridical force.").
440. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 22, 1 90.
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It would be tempting to evade the question and claim that it
will rarely, if ever, present itself. Most laws do not concern
matters of natural justice; rather, they concern matters of convention that, nevertheless, relate to the common good. People
of good faith can reasonably disagree as to the precise way to
address a given situation, and Catholic social teaching recognizes "a legitimate plurality" within which possible solutions
may be proposed. 441 Nevertheless, even if it is conceded that
unjust laws are rare, the possibility still exists.
Another possible response would be for the conscientious
judge to invalidate an unjust law by invoking a superior legal
authority. When striking down a statute that forbids flag burning" 2 or mandates prayer in the public schools, 443 it should be
sufficient for a court to analyze the law in light of the constitutional text, its historical intent, the structure of the Constitution,
and relevant precedent, without assessing the merits of the legislation at issue from a political point of view. 44 This is not to
suggest that constitutional interpretation is simply a mechanical exercise, or that legal interpretation does not call for the exercise of normative judgment; it often does, but the need for
such judgment is often attenuated based on other factors. 445
Such an approach is entirely in line with what Altman describes as legal neutrality in that it does not require the judge to
reevaluate the choices made by the political branches of government. Indeed, because laws that are the product of the political process are subordinate to rights that stand beyond the
bounds of politics, legal neutrality would require such a result.
Still, there may well be instances in which arguments based
on the constitutional text, historical intent, and precedent will
prove unavailing. Faced with the prospect of enforcing an in441. See Octogesima Adveniens, supra note 134, 46; see also Gaudium et Spes, supra
note 59, 91
43 (noting that "the Christian view of things will itself suggest some
specific solution in certain circumstances" but that "it happens rather frequently,
and legitimately so, that with equal sincerity some of the faithful will disagree
with others on a given matter").
442. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
443. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
444. For a typology of constitutional argument similar to this, see PHILIP BOBBIIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 7 (1982) (arguing that there are five types of constitutional argument: historical, textual, structural, prudential, and doctrinal).
445. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1231-51 (1987).
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herently unjust law, Catholic social thought would support two
disparate courses of action. First, a conscientious judge could
invalidate an inherently unjust law if he or she found that it
violated "the objective moral order" 44 6 by inflicting a gross evil.
The open-textured nature of many constitutional provisions
certainly invites judicial reasoning that is more overtly normafive in character, especially where other modes of argumentation fail. Still, in doing so, such a judge would be subject to the
criticism that he or she was acting like a policymaker, "legislating from the bench," 447 and reweighing the competing values
presented in the legislature. From the perspective of Catholic
social teaching, however, such a judge would be guilty only of
recognizing "the transcendent dignity of the human person"
that makes law possible and without which there is only "the
force of power." 448 As Professor Gerard Bradley has argued, a
recusant judge should be seen as acting "for the common good
by not giving effect to the positive law." 449 Second, in certain
instances, a judge will be unable to argue that the legislative act
in question is not a valid and enforceable legal measure. Indeed, the language and intention of the constitutional text authorizing such measures may preclude a contrary legal opinion
that is both intellectually honest and compelling. 4 0 To avoid
providing material cooperation to the implementation of an
unjust law involving grave evil, a judge may have to recuse
451
himself or herself from the proceedings.

446. DignitatisHumanae, supra note 63, 7.
447. For an overview of the meanings attributed to this phrase, see Bruce G.
Peabody, Legislatingfrom the Bench: A Definition and a Defense, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 185 (2007).
448. Centesimus Annus, supra note 58, 44.
449. Gerard V. Bradley, Moral Truth, the Common Good, and Judicial Review, in
CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND COMMUNITARIANISM, supra note 58, at 115, 129
(empahsis omitted).
450. See Fallon, supra note 445, at 1282-85 (concluding that, although morally
objectionable, the constitutional language and the history of the Framers' intent
concerning the question of slavery render hopelessly implausible an interpretation of the Constitution prior to the Civil War amendments that would have permitted a court to declare the practice of slavery unconstitutional).
451. For an excellent article discussing the distinction between formal and material cooperation with evil and the ability of Catholic judges to enforce laws that
are contrary to the objective moral order, see Edward A. Hartnett, Catholic Judges
and Cooperation in Sin, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 221 (2006). See also John H. Garvey &
Amy V. Coney, CatholicJudges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 305-06 (1997)
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Legal Neutrality and the Absence of Partisanship

Altman, however, does not address one particular dimension
of legal neutrality, perhaps because it is not peculiarly liberal in
nature. 412 Still, this aspect of neutrality is essential to the proper
functioning of any civil society. It is, as Cass Sunstein describes,
45 3
the simple notion of neutrality as the absence of partisanship.
According to this view of neutrality, "government may not play
favorites; it must be impartial. It may not, for example, take resources or opportunities from one person solely for the benefit of
another. Nor may it make social outcomes depend entirely on
the exercise of political influence."4M The idea of neutrality presented here is that of a decision maker who is not susceptible to
corruption or intimidation; it is one who suffers from no conflict
of interest-whether from his or her own background and past
experiences, or from his or her current financial holdings and
personal and familial relations-that would incline him or her
toward or against any party to the dispute. This adjudicatory
neutrality is best summarized as that habit of mind and disposition of temperament called "judicial independence."
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Church's social teaching fully
supports this aspect of neutrality. As Pope John XXIII wrote in
Pacem in Terris, the "human person is... entitled to a juridical
protection of his rights, a protection that should be efficacious,
impartial, and inspired by the true norms of justice." 45 He likewise insisted that "the courts must administer justice impartially
46
and without being influenced by favoritism or pressure."
The importance of impartiality in Catholic social thought
suggests an analogy between an unjust law and a biased judge.
(concluding that Catholic judges may not sentence individuals to death, preside
over the sentencing phase of a capital trial, or affirm a death sentence on appeal).
452. Cf. ALTMAN, supra note 17, at 71 (noting his disquiet that "political neutrality means merely the absence of state bias with respect to any normative view
above the threshold set by [the] objective conception" of the just and right).
453. See Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in ConstitutionalLaw (with Special Reference to
Pornography,Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1992).
454. Id. at 1.
455. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, T 27; cf. Quadragesimo Anno, supra note 67,
1109 (arguing that the state, in its regulation of economic life, "should be the
supreme arbiter, ruling in queenly fashion far above all party contention, intent
only upon justice and the common good").
456. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 9U69; see also Gaudium et Spes, supra note 59,
175 (urging those who enter politics "to exercise this art without thought of personal convenience and without benefit of bribery").
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Just as the Church teaches that a law "opposed to the moral
order" 457 is not "law," a judge who is not impartial, who is biased in favor of one party, or who has prejudged a matter before the case is presented, is not a "judge." He or she does not
engage in judging, exploring the meaning of the law by considering different points of view, or weighing the evidence introduced. Such a person is not a judge but a mouthpiece for a
foregone conclusion. Adorned in robes, gavel in hand, such a
person may appear to be a judge, but this appearance is deceit,
a mere sham. In truth, such a person has abandoned the substance of his or her office. Indeed, that a judge abdicates the
judicial role by allowing himself or herself to be influenced by
financial interests, biases and prejudices, or the influence of
anyone outside the adjudicative process, is reflected in the se48
vere way judicial ethics treats such lapses.
The significance of this conclusion-that someone who may
appear to be a judge is not, in fact, a judge-should not be
overstated. A person is free to disobey the orders of someone
who has betrayed the judicial office, just as he or she is free to
disregard an unjust law. In either case, the command of the
sovereign is not binding on the conscience of the human person. Still, freedom of conscience does not mean freedom from
consequences. From the Catholic point of view, the enforcement of an unjust law is not a matter of justice but an act of
state violence, and a person who disregards such a statute is
not a lawbreaker but a conscientious objector victimized by the
state. Similarly, a judge can still employ the real force of the
state in implementing an order, no matter how corrupt the order may be. The sting of the state's coercive power is still very
real, and a person who challenges an unjust law or a corrupt
judge must be prepared to suffer the real consequences that
459
may follow such a decision.

457. Pacem in Terris, supra note 24, 9 51.
458. See generally MODEL RULES FOR JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT

(1994) (providing for sanctions for judicial misconduct ranging from disciplinary
agreements to removal).
459. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (upholding
against First Amendment challenge contempt convictions of civil rights protestors
for violating an ex parte injunction issued by an Alabama court prohibiting them
from engaging in street parades without a permit).
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CONCLUSION

This Article has not been simply an extended comparison between the tenets of liberal legal theory and Catholic social
thought with respect to the idea of "neutrality in law." Surely,
one of the purposes of this Article has been to see what these
two jurisprudential perspectives hold in common and where
they disagree. More than simple juxtaposition, however, the
point of this comparison has been to examine the reasons behind these differences, and to explore in some depth the intellectual landscape each claims.
No country's borders are ever truly neutral; even states with
the best of relations insist on territorial integrity. In the same
way, the liberal foundations of law and justice are not neutral.
The conceptual apparatus of liberal theory-the four varieties
of neutrality that Altman identifies-give the liberal state its
defining characteristics, its settled borders. They demarcate the
normative boundaries of the liberal state.
In this Article I have argued that many of the features that
make the liberal state attractive and a desirable place in which
to live are preserved in the new territory marked out by the
principles of Catholic social thought. These features include
popular government in which power is widely diffused among
distinct branches, an independent and impartial judiciary, and
a wide array of individual rights that guarantee a robust conception of freedom.
At the same time, Catholic social thought offers other features
that simply do not exist within the confines of the liberal state.
Catholic social thought refuses to indulge in the conceit that a
meaningful theory of law and justice can avoid relying upon a
philosophical understanding of human nature. That liberal anthropology is often understated in liberal legal theory does not
mean that it is any less decisive in determining the contours of
liberal justice. By contrast, Catholic social thought forthrightly
embodies an anthropology that understands human beings as
free but conditioned, capable of depravity but called to the
greatness of love. Moreover, because this understanding is
grounded in the truth of the human person and his or her authentic good, it provides a more rigorous and secure foundation
for the legal rights that liberal theory purports to cherish.
Catholic social thought understands that the freedom guaranteed by legal rights is ordered toward the good and that this
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good can be both peculiar to individuals in their circumstances
and common to all. From this perspective, the enjoyment of
rights is valued as a means of participating in the good to
which human nature is ordered. Thus, Catholic social thought
also rejects the liberal notion that "the right" is somehow prior
to "the good." Although the obligation to act with justice toward others is "prior" in that it is the first duty in social life,
justice and the right are only intelligible in terms of the good.
Catholic social thought refuses to see the human person as
merely a holder of rights, an unencumbered self460 whose obligations are limited to acts of individual consent. It recognizes
that the human person is also the subject of moral duties, the
fulfillment of which the state is obliged to encourage through
noncoercive means. Without something more than respect for
the rights of fellow citizens, indeed, in the absence of a responsible exercise of freedom and an active sense of solidarity, social life in the liberal state will never rise above the sense of
alienation and perpetual struggle for power that plagues life in
the West today.
The law does not dream, but it is a place where dreamers live
and work, experiencing the present while imagining the future. 461 Looking at the law from the new vantage point afforded
by Catholic social thought allows us to imagine new possibilities. From this vista we are invited to see beyond the borders of
liberalism. Indeed, the Catholic social tradition offers an invitation to see beyond the civilization of tolerance to an undiscovered country: the civilization of love. Perhaps, when the limits
of liberalism are better appreciated, those of us who yearn for
more might take up the invitation to look beyond our shores to
this new world.

460. See SANDEL, supra note 2, at 6.
461. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 407-10 (1986) (arguing that the
dreams of legal philosophers are "already latent in the present law").
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